Commonwealth v. Gomes

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for murder in the first degree and unlawful possession of a firearm, as well as the denial of his motion for a new trial. The court rejected challenges concerning testimony about cocaine, evidence of motive, a reference to police reports, the prosecutor’s closing argument, and relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

1. The challenged testimony did not require a new trial. Even assuming defense counsel should have objected, any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the testimony was relevant to the background of the murder, the judge specifically instructed the jury to disregard the witness's identification of the substance as cocaine, and the Commonwealth's evidence was strong.
2. The trial judge properly admitted the evidence because it was relevant to the defendant's state of mind at the time of the killing and to identifying him as the shooter.
3. The trial judge did not abuse his discretion by denying the defendant's motion for a mistrial after a witness made a single improper reference to police reports, because the objection was sustained and the judge gave a prompt, forceful curative instruction.
4. The prosecutor's remark was improper because the jury could have understood it as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify or to produce witnesses, but the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt and did not warrant reversal.
5. No relief was warranted under § 33E. Premeditation may arise from an instantaneous conscious decision to kill, and Massachusetts law does not require hours or days of planning for deliberate premeditation.

Questions Presented

1. Whether testimony that the defendant was "bagging coke" was improperly admitted and required a new trial.
2. Whether evidence concerning the defendant's statement about his daughter and a child-custody proceeding was relevant and properly admitted.
3. Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a mistrial after a witness referred to "old police reports."
4. Whether the prosecutor's closing-argument remark that defense counsel was the only person who had testified that the defendant was not the shooter violated the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination and required reversal.
5. Whether relief was warranted under G. L. c. 278, § 33E based on the defendant's argument that the shooting lacked the degree of premeditation required for first-degree murder.

Disposition

affirmed