Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that proceedings under the current sexually dangerous person commitment statute may proceed against an incompetent respondent without appointing a guardian ad litem. The respondent’s attorney may exercise or waive statutory rights, including the right to a jury trial, and commitment is not unconstitutional merely because treatment may be ineffective. To protect due process, however, the Commonwealth must seek appointment of court-appointed counsel before continuing the commitment of an incompetent person beyond the initial or subsequent one-year term.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Supreme Judicial Court's interpretation of the former sexually dangerous person statute in Commonwealth v. Knowlton applies to proceedings under the current G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12-14.
- Whether a petition for indeterminate sexually dangerous person commitment may proceed against an incompetent respondent.
- Who may exercise or waive the respondent's substantive statutory rights when the respondent is incompetent.
- Whether an incompetent respondent who cannot participate in statutory therapy may be civilly committed to the treatment center.
- Whether G. L. c. 123A, § 14(a), requires a jury trial when the respondent is incapable of affirmatively waiving that right.
- Whether the Trial Court must appoint a guardian ad litem and use substituted judgment to determine whether an incompetent respondent should exercise or waive substantive rights.
- Whether due process requires a mechanism for periodic review and appointment of counsel to protect an incompetent person's rights during continuing sexually dangerous person commitment.
- Whether the Commonwealth must pursue commitment under G. L. c. 123 rather than G. L. c. 123A.
Holdings
- Commonwealth v. Knowlton's interpretation of the repealed statutory provisions does not apply to the materially different provisions of the current G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12-14.
- Due process does not prohibit trial of a sexually dangerous person commitment petition against an incompetent respondent who is represented by counsel.
- When the respondent is incompetent to exercise statutory rights under G. L. c. 123A, counsel may generally exercise or waive those rights, including the right to a jury trial.
- G. L. c. 123A, § 14(a), does not require a jury trial when an incompetent respondent cannot personally affirmatively waive a jury; counsel may invoke or waive the right.
- A guardian ad litem need not be appointed in the ordinary case to exercise or waive an incompetent respondent's rights, and due process does not require such an appointment at this stage.
- An incompetent or otherwise untreatable sexually dangerous person may be committed under G. L. c. 123A when the statutory dangerousness standard is satisfied; effective treatment is not a constitutional prerequisite to commitment.
- The decision whether to seek commitment under G. L. c. 123 or G. L. c. 123A is reserved to the appropriate executive official, not the court.
- Before the expiration of the initial one-year commitment term, and before each subsequent term for which continued commitment is sought, the Commonwealth must seek appointment of a court-appointed attorney for an incompetent person who remains sexually dangerous; that attorney may exercise the person's rights in the review proceeding.
Key quotations
“The language of G. L. c. 123A, §§ 12-14, differs markedly from that of the prior statute and leaves no doubt that the Legislature intended SDP proceedings to go forward against an incompetent person without appointment of a guardian ad litem and without substantial delay.” (590)
“Due process is not offended by subjecting the defendant, with the assistance of counsel, to trial of the Commonwealth’s petition as provided in § 14.” (591)
“In order to continue the commitment of an incompetent person, if the Commonwealth believes that such person continues to be sexually dangerous, it must seek appointment of a court-appointed attorney for the incompetent person before the expiration of the initial term of one year.” (597-598)
Factual background
Nieves had prior convictions for violent sexual offenses and numerous disciplinary violations while incarcerated. In anticipation of his release, the Commonwealth petitioned to commit him as a sexually dangerous person; qualified examiners concluded that he was likely to commit additional sexual offenses if not confined, and later examiners concluded that he met the statutory definition of a sexually dangerous person. The Superior Court judge found Nieves incompetent to proceed and denied the Commonwealth's motion for trial pending proof of competency.
Procedural history
The Commonwealth petitioned in the Superior Court to commit Nieves as a sexually dangerous person under G. L. c. 123A. After the defendant was found incompetent to proceed, the Superior Court judge found probable cause but denied the Commonwealth's motion for trial pending a showing that the defendant was competent. The judge reported the ruling and six questions to the Appeals Court under G. L. c. 231, § 111, and Mass. R. Civ. P. 64; the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the case and vacated the order.
Remand instructions
The order denying the Commonwealth's petition for trial under G. L. c. 123A, § 14, was vacated. The matter was remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion, including proceedings against the incompetent respondent with representation by counsel and compliance with the required counsel-appointment mechanism for continuing commitment.