Drayton v. Commonwealth

450 Mass. 1021 (2008) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · January 16, 2008

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the denial of Freddie Lee Drayton’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person. The court held that neither the Massachusetts nor Federal Constitution requires proof of a charge or conviction for a prior sexual offense as a prerequisite to such commitment. It also rejected Drayton’s argument that the governing statute was limited to sexual misconduct involving victims under sixteen.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
January 16, 2008
Procedural posture
Appeal from a single justice's denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging continued civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person.
Standard of review
Review of the denial of extraordinary habeas corpus relief; the court determined whether the petition stated a legally meritorious constitutional or statutory claim.
Precedential value
Published Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinion; precedential.
Parties
Freddie Lee Drayton v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

state post-conviction reliefsubstantive due processstatutory interpretationremedies

Practice areas

Habeas corpusPost-conviction reliefCivil commitmentConstitutional lawStatutory interpretation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether substantive due process requires proof that a person committed or was charged with a prior sexual offense before the person may be civilly committed as sexually dangerous under G. L. c. 123A.
  2. Whether the version of G. L. c. 123A, § 1, applicable to Drayton's 1980 commitment was limited to sexual misconduct involving victims under sixteen years of age.

Holdings

  1. Neither the Federal Constitution nor the Massachusetts Constitution requires proof that the person was charged with or convicted of a prior sexual offense as a prerequisite to civil commitment as a sexually dangerous person under the challenged statute.
  2. The applicable version of G. L. c. 123A, § 1, was not limited to sexual misconduct involving victims under sixteen; it covered repetitive or compulsive sexual behavior together with either violence or aggression by an adult against a victim under sixteen.

Key quotations

Drayton has identified no case law, nor are we aware of any, holding that a charge or conviction of a prior sexual offense is constitutionally mandated as a prerequisite to the civil commitment of a person as a sexually dangerous person (450 Mass. at 1021)
Rather, the statute applied to sexual misconduct involving repetitive or compulsive behavior (which Drayton does not challenge) and either (1) violence or (2) aggression by an adult against a victim under the age of sixteen years. (450 Mass. at 1022)

Factual background

In 1980, while serving sentences for two manslaughter convictions, Drayton was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center as a sexually dangerous person. The commitment was based on a sexual assault against one of his homicide victims, although Drayton was never criminally charged with that sexual assault. His criminal sentences expired in 1984, but he remained confined under G. L. c. 123A and repeatedly sought release. He later challenged the constitutionality and interpretation of the statute governing his commitment.

Procedural history

Drayton was committed to the Massachusetts Treatment Center in 1980 as a sexually dangerous person and did not appeal the commitment order. After unsuccessful petitions for release, he filed a habeas petition in the county court in 2004. A single justice denied the petition without a hearing and denied reconsideration; the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.

Court Document

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