Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Maurice Felder’s convictions for two first-degree murders and related offenses arising from a joint-venture robbery and shootings. The court rejected challenges concerning late disclosure of photographs, prosecutorial closing argument, jury instructions, and the alleged duplicative nature of the armed-robbery conviction. The court also found no basis for relief under its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by denying a requested jury-instruction sanction for the Commonwealth's alleged late production of footprint photographs.
- Whether the prosecutor's closing argument improperly appealed to sympathy, vouched for the Commonwealth's evidence, characterized defense arguments as smoke screens, or misstated DNA evidence.
- Whether the judge erred by refusing to give a Commonwealth v. Ciampa instruction concerning a witness's cooperation agreement.
- Whether the instruction that the jury had a duty to return the highest crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt improperly removed the jury's discretion to determine the degree of murder.
- Whether the armed-robbery conviction was duplicative of the murder conviction because armed robbery served as the predicate felony for felony murder.
- Whether the court should grant relief under its authority pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the requested sanction because there was no evidence that the Commonwealth violated its discovery obligation and, even assuming a violation, the defendant was able to make effective use of the photographs.
- The challenged portions of the prosecutor's closing argument did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
- Felder was not entitled to a Commonwealth v. Ciampa instruction because the witness did not testify pursuant to a plea or immunity agreement requiring him to testify at trial.
- The jury instruction did not violate due process or improperly foreclose the jury's authority to determine the degree of murder.
- The armed-robbery conviction was not duplicative of the murder conviction and did not have to be vacated because the murder verdict was independently supported by deliberate premeditation and extreme atrocity or cruelty in addition to felony murder.
- The court found no basis to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to vacate the murder convictions or order a new trial.
Key quotations
“When the Commonwealth fails to comply with its discovery mandate, “the court may make a further order for discovery, grant a continuance, or enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.”” (455 Mass. at 367)
“It is up to the jury to find the degree of murder, in other words whether it was first or second degree murder.” (455 Mass. at 370)
“where, as here, the conviction of murder is based on a theory [or theories] in addition to the theory of felony-murder, the conviction of the underlying felony stands.” (455 Mass. at 371)
Factual background
Felder and two codefendants entered Mark Young's home and forced Young to lure Tyrone Lewis, Jr., to the house under the pretense of a drug transaction. They also brought Adrian White into the home, restrained the three victims, and attempted to rob Lewis of money. The defendants tied the victims in an attic and shot Lewis and White; both died. Felder later obtained a bag containing money from Lewis's girlfriend, returned to the house, and was arrested after seeking treatment for a gunshot wound, with $7,000 in cash found in his clothing.
Procedural history
A jury convicted Felder on February 26, 2007, of two counts of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, unlawful possession of a firearm, unlawful possession of ammunition, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. During trial, the judge denied a requested sanction based on allegedly late-produced photographs. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed all convictions and declined to exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.