Commonwealth v. Morgan

453 Mass. 54 (2009) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · January 13, 2009

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Dana H. Morgan’s convictions for murder in the first degree and perjury before the grand jury. The court held that trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to retain independent experts to challenge the DNA and wound evidence, and that Morgan had not made the specific showing required for postconviction expert discovery. The court also upheld the denial of a new-trial motion without an evidentiary hearing and found no basis under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Cordy, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
January 13, 2009
Procedural posture
Morgan appealed from his convictions of murder in the first degree and perjury before the grand jury, and from orders denying postconviction discovery and a motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the ineffective-assistance claim under Massachusetts's more favorable substantial-likelihood-of-a-miscarriage-of-justice standard, asking whether trial error likely influenced the jury's conclusion. Strategic decisions constitute error only if manifestly unreasonable when made. Postconviction discovery requires a sufficient showing that discovery is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant a new trial. Whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a new-trial motion is within the motion judge's discretion, and substantial deference is owed to the decision that the motion and supporting materials do not raise a substantial issue. The court independently reviewed the murder verdict under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E.
Precedential value
precedential
Parties
Dana H. Morgan v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

ineffective assistancepost-conviction reliefexpert testimonyevidenceappellate procedure

Practice areas

criminal procedurepost-conviction reliefineffective assistance of counselcriminal evidence

Questions Presented

  1. Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain independent experts to challenge the DNA evidence and the medical examiner's testimony about the knife wounds.
  2. Whether the trial judge erred by denying Morgan's motion for postconviction appointment of expert witnesses to review the DNA and wound evidence.
  3. Whether the trial judge erred by denying the motion for a new trial without holding an evidentiary hearing.
  4. Whether the first-degree murder verdict should be set aside or reduced under the court's independent review pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

  1. Trial counsel was not ineffective for stipulating to the DNA evidence and failing to retain an independent DNA expert because the stipulation advanced the defense theory, the testing was performed by a reputable independent laboratory, and Morgan identified no reason to suspect error.
  2. Trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to retain an independent pathologist because counsel elicited testimony supporting the defense theory and Morgan failed to show how an independent pathologist would have materially aided the defense.
  3. A defendant seeking postconviction appointment of experts must make a specific, nonspeculative showing that the requested assistance is reasonably likely to uncover evidence that might warrant a new trial; Morgan did not make that showing.
  4. The trial judge did not err by denying Morgan's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing because the motion and supporting affidavit did not raise a substantial issue.
  5. The evidence supported Morgan's conviction of murder in the first degree by deliberate premeditation, and there was no basis to set aside or reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial.

Key quotations

We consider his claim to determine whether there exists a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice, a standard more favorable to a defendant than the constitutional standard for determining the ineffectiveness of counsel. (59)
The consistency of the test results combined with the defense offered made defense counsel’s decision not to hire his own independent expert to perform further DNA testing a reasonable professional judgment that we will not second-guess. (60)
Mere speculation is insufficient to support a request for postconviction appointment of an expert to review the DNA evidence. (63)
We give substantial deference to a judge’s conclusion in this regard. (64)

Factual background

Heinold threatened to harm Morgan's son unless the son took responsibility for drug charges, and Heinold was later found stabbed to death in his room. Morgan had a drop of blood in the hallway but no blood in Heinold's room, and he initially denied knowledge of the killing. After receiving Miranda warnings in Texas, Morgan confessed that he had used a double-edged knife to stab Heinold and cut his throat, but he later recanted and claimed he had falsely confessed to protect his son. At trial, defense counsel used DNA evidence and the medical examiner's testimony that the wounds were consistent with a single-edged blade to support the false-confession defense.

Procedural history

A jury convicted Morgan of murder in the first degree on a deliberate-premeditation theory and of perjury before the grand jury. The trial court denied his motion for a new trial and motion for postconviction appointment of expert witnesses without an evidentiary hearing. This was Morgan's second trial; the first ended in a mistrial after his son invoked the Fifth Amendment before the jury. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the orders denying postconviction discovery and a new trial.

Court Document

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