Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that an employee’s 1999 discrimination claims could not proceed because he had not filed a predicate complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination concerning those claims. The court concluded that the Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the claims on which the jury awarded damages, set aside the verdict and fee award, and remanded for entry of a judgment of dismissal.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Superior Court had subject matter jurisdiction over Everett's 1999 discrimination claims when those claims had not been included in his MCAD complaint or added by amendment during the MCAD investigation.
- Whether the 1999 refusal to rehire was sufficiently related to the 1996-1997 events to fall within the scope of the MCAD investigation.
- Whether primary jurisdiction required referral to the DOT of the disputed issue of Everett's medical qualification to drive commercial motor vehicles.
Holdings
- A predicate complaint to the MCAD is mandatory before a civil discrimination action may be brought under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B, and the failure to file an MCAD complaint concerning the 1999 conduct deprived the Superior Court of subject matter jurisdiction over the only claims on which the jury awarded damages.
- The 1999 refusal to rehire was not reasonably related to, and was not within the scope of the investigation reasonably expected to grow out of, Everett's 1996-1997 MCAD charge.
- The DOT had exclusive authority to resolve the disputed medical qualification issue, so primary jurisdiction applied and the trial court should have stayed the case or otherwise referred that issue to the DOT before proceeding.
Key quotations
“The predicate of administrative filing is mandatory to filing a civil suit. It may not be waived.” (at 600)
“Because no discriminatory nexus connected the 1996-1997 and 1999 events, the 1999 events became the only events that Everett alleged to be discriminatory; they were free-standing.” (at 605)
“Where an initial termination is lawful, an employee is not entitled, solely by virtue of his previous employment, to be rehired on request once he has corrected the grounds of the lawful termination.” (at 607)
“The question of his qualifications for his job — a dispositive prong of his prima facie case — was not for the jury, or for the judge, but for the DOT, subject to review by the United States Court of Appeals.” (at 610)
Factual background
Everett had worked as a commercial truck driver for the company since 1986. After a 1996 psychiatric hospitalization, the company's physicians declined to certify him as medically qualified under Department of Transportation regulations to drive commercial motor vehicles, and the company did not allow him to return to work. Everett later obtained DOT certificates and drove for other employers, then sought reinstatement from the company in January 1999 based on new evidence of his purported qualifications. He had filed an MCAD charge in 1997 concerning the earlier events, but he did not file or amend an MCAD complaint concerning the company's alleged 1999 refusal to rehire him.
Procedural history
Everett sued his former employer under the ADA and Massachusetts General Laws chapter 151B. Although his complaint and pretrial theory concerned alleged discrimination beginning in 1996 or 1997, he expressly waived claims before 1999 at trial and sought damages only for the alleged refusal to rehire him in 1999. The jury found the 1996-1997 termination lawful but found discrimination in the 1999 refusal to rehire and awarded $757,701; the trial judge allowed amendment of the complaint and awarded $370,678.58 in fees and costs. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the 1999 claims had not been presented to the MCAD and therefore were outside the Superior Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Remand instructions
Set aside the jury verdict and the award of fees and costs, and remand to the Superior Court for entry of a judgment of dismissal.