Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considers whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively to a collateral challenge to guilty pleas entered after the effective date of IIRIRA. The court holds that Padilla applies retroactively to such convictions because it represents an application of the established Strickland ineffective-assistance standard. The court nevertheless affirms denial of the defendant’s motion for a new trial because he failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have rejected the plea agreement had he been properly advised of the immigration consequences.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Padilla v. Kentucky applies retroactively on collateral review to guilty pleas entered after the effective date of IIRIRA.
- Whether the defendant established ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to advise him of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas.
- Whether the defendant demonstrated prejudice by showing a reasonable probability that, absent counsel's error, he would have rejected the plea bargain and that doing so would have been rational under the circumstances.
Holdings
- Padilla is not a new constitutional rule for Teague purposes; it is an application of the established Strickland v. Washington ineffective-assistance standard. Padilla therefore applies retroactively on collateral review to convictions obtained on or after April 1, 1997, the effective date of IIRIRA.
- The defendant made a sufficient showing that counsel's failure to ascertain his citizenship and advise him of the substantial risk of deportation satisfied the first prong of the Massachusetts Saferian standard and the corresponding Strickland deficiency requirement.
- The defendant failed to establish prejudice because he did not aver that he would have rejected the plea and insisted on trial, did not show that rejecting the plea would have been rational, and did not identify an available substantial defense, a reasonably probable immigration-neutral plea bargain, or special circumstances demonstrating that immigration consequences would have materially affected his decision.
Key quotations
“For these reasons, we conclude that the holding in Padilla is to be applied retroactively to criminal convictions obtained after the effective date of IIRIRA, April 1, 1997, the point at which deportation became “intimately related to the criminal process” and “nearly an automatic result for a broad class of noncitizen offenders.”” (at 45)
“We decline to do so where the defendant has come nowhere near meeting the burden he bears on the issue of prejudice.” (at 49)
“Order denying motion for a new trial affirmed.” (at 49)
Factual background
Police officers approached the seventeen-year-old defendant in Boston after observing him near a residence and smelling alcohol. A patfrisk revealed small bottles of brandy, and a search incident to arrest revealed crack cocaine, marijuana, a cellular telephone, and $1,115 in cash. The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of class B and class D substances with intent to distribute and underage possession of liquor in exchange for dismissal of two school-zone charges. After the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings, he asserted that plea counsel had not advised him of the immigration consequences, although the plea documents and docket reflected that a general deportation warning had been given.
Procedural history
The defendant pleaded guilty in 2005 to possession of controlled substances with intent to distribute and underage possession of liquor. In exchange, the Commonwealth dismissed two school-zone charges carrying mandatory minimum sentences. After receiving a notice to appear for removal proceedings, the defendant filed a first motion for a new trial, which was denied. He then filed a second motion alleging that counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of his pleas; that motion was denied without a written decision. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed.