Commonwealth v. Stewart

460 Mass. 817 (2011) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · November 10, 2011

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, armed robbery, and assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting felony-murder, jury instructions concerning suicide watch testimony, deliberate premeditation, malice, mental impairment, and felony-murder, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Ireland, C.J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
November 10, 2011
Procedural posture
Direct appeal from convictions of murder in the first degree, armed robbery, and three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon.
Standard of review
Unpreserved jury-instruction claims were reviewed for a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice. Relevance rulings were reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ineffective-assistance claims in a first-degree murder appeal were reviewed under the more favorable substantial-likelihood-of-a-miscarriage-of-justice standard under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, with deference to tactical decisions unless manifestly unreasonable when made. The sufficiency claim was reviewed for whether the evidence permitted a rational jury to find the elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
Precedential value
Published opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court; precedential.
Parties
Stewart v. Commonwealth
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal procedurejury instructionsevidenceineffective assistanceburden of proof

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal procedureevidenceconstitutional lawineffective assistance of counsel

Questions Presented

  1. Whether sufficient evidence supported the armed-robbery conviction and the felony-murder theory when the defendant claimed that the victim had voluntarily given him the truck keys in exchange for drugs.
  2. Whether the judge improperly instructed the jury to disregard evidence that the defendant had been placed on suicide watch.
  3. Whether the jury instructions on deliberate premeditation, second-degree murder, mental impairment, and felony-murder or lesser included offenses were erroneous.
  4. Whether defense counsel rendered ineffective assistance through the challenged jury-instruction decisions and an all-or-nothing closing argument.
  5. Whether relief was warranted under the Supreme Judicial Court's plenary review authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.

Holdings

  1. The evidence was sufficient for the jury to find armed robbery because it could disbelieve the defendant's account that the victim voluntarily lent him the truck and could infer that the defendant took the victim's wallet and clothing by force or violence with intent permanently to deprive him of them. The armed robbery therefore could serve as the predicate felony for first-degree felony-murder.
  2. The judge did not abuse his discretion by instructing the jury to disregard the fact that the defendant was placed on suicide watch because the jury heard the relevant evidence concerning the defendant's crying, behavior, and mental state.
  3. The deliberate-premeditation instruction adequately required proof that the defendant thought before acting, reflected on his resolution to kill, and reached the decision to kill after at least a short period of reflection.
  4. The instructions adequately conveyed that second-degree murder could be based on any applicable form of malice and did not improperly require the jury to find a specific intent to kill.
  5. The mental-impairment instruction was not erroneous because it directed the jury to consider credible evidence of drug use and mental or emotional condition when deciding whether the Commonwealth proved the required knowledge or intent, and the charge correctly explained the relationship between impairment and first- and second-degree murder.
  6. The judge was not required to instruct on felony-murder in the second degree or on the proposed lesser included offenses because mental impairment did not distinguish first-degree from second-degree felony-murder, and the proposed assault offenses were not lesser included offenses of armed robbery on the record presented.
  7. Defense counsel was not constitutionally ineffective for failing to request the challenged instructions or for pursuing an all-or-nothing mental-impairment defense in closing argument.

Key quotations

The Commonwealth has to prove the defendant thought before he acted; that is, [he] decided to kill after some deliberation. The element of deliberation, however, does not require an extended time span, nor does it mean that the deliberation must be accomplished slowly. (825)
Where a judge properly instructs that “mental impairment is a factor to be weighed in the jury’s consideration whether deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty existed, ... he [is] not required to instruct that sufficient mental incapacity can reduce first degree murder to second degree murder.” (830)

Factual background

The defendant and Frank Carpenter attacked and killed Nicholas Martone after discussing taking Martone's truck. The defendant stabbed Martone with Martone's knife, strangled him with his belt, and helped conceal the body and property. The defendant later made statements to witnesses and police describing the killing, and police recovered the victim's body, wallet, clothing, and knife. At trial, the defendant conceded participation in the killing but argued that drug use and mental-health conditions prevented him from forming the requisite intent.

Procedural history

The defendant was convicted in the trial court of murder in the first degree on theories of felony-murder, deliberate premeditation, and extreme atrocity or cruelty; armed robbery; and three charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. He moved for required findings of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of all evidence, but the motions were denied. The Supreme Judicial Court reviewed the convictions, including under its duty pursuant to G. L. c. 278, § 33E, and affirmed.

Court Document

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