Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reviewed a first-degree murder conviction and related firearms and assault convictions arising from a shooting in Boston. The defendant challenged the use of a peremptory strike against an African-American juror, admission of juvenile-record evidence, portions of the prosecutor’s closing argument, and the denial of a defense-of-another instruction and new trial. The court affirmed the convictions and declined to reduce the murder verdict or grant a new trial.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the trial judge improperly allowed the prosecutor's peremptory challenge of an African-American juror.
- Whether testimony concerning the defendant's juvenile record was improperly admitted and, if so, whether it caused prejudicial error.
- Whether portions of the prosecutor's closing argument constituted reversible misconduct or improperly shifted the burden of proof.
- Whether the evidence required an instruction on defense of another.
- Whether the trial judge improperly denied the defendant's motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing and whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to seek suppression of the defendant's statements as involuntary.
- Whether the court should exercise its authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to order a new trial or reduce the degree of guilt.
Holdings
- The trial judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the prosecutor's peremptory challenge because the defendant did not establish a prima facie case of discriminatory exclusion, and the record supported the judge's conclusion that there was no pattern of racial discrimination.
- Although the prosecutor's repeated questioning about the defendant's juvenile record was improper because the prosecutor lacked the required certified record, the error was not prejudicial because the judge immediately struck the testimony and instructed the jury to disregard it.
- Some personal comments about defense counsel exceeded the bounds of proper argument, but the challenged comments and the prosecutor's burden-of-proof statement did not constitute prejudicial error requiring reversal.
- The defendant was not entitled to an instruction on defense of another because the evidence, viewed favorably to him, did not support a reasonable belief that his girlfriend was being attacked or required deadly force for her protection.
- The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial without an evidentiary hearing, and counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress the defendant's statements because such a motion would have been unsuccessful.
- After reviewing the entire record, the court found no reason to order a new trial or reduce the first-degree murder verdict.
Key quotations
“An individual is entitled to use force to protect a third person if “(a) a reasonable person in the actor’s position would believe his intervention to be necessary for the protection of the third person, and (b) in the circumstances as that reasonable person would believe them to be, the third person would be justified in using such force to protect himself.”” (576)
“Counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress statements that would have been unsuccessful.” (578)
Factual background
The defendant shot Nabil Essaid and fired at Ahmed Obbada and Mohemmed Lebdoui outside a Boston movie theater. The defendant admitted the shooting but claimed self-defense and defense of his pregnant girlfriend, asserting that the men surrounded him and that Obbada appeared to reach for a weapon. Approximately two months later, while fleeing Boston police, the defendant possessed and fired a Glock, pointed it at police officers, and ultimately held it to his own head before surrendering.
Procedural history
A Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of murder in the first degree and several assault and firearms offenses. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion for a new trial based principally on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the convictions and the order denying a new trial, and declined to reduce the murder verdict or order a new trial under its § 33E review.