Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that the recreational use statute, G. L. c. 21, § 17C, provides an exemption from liability rather than immunity from suit, so the denial of the City of Newton’s summary judgment motion was not immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution. The court nevertheless considered the merits and held that summary judgment was properly denied because the city charged a fee for the reserved use of its field and had not established that the payment merely reimbursed marginal costs attributable to the league’s use. The appeal was dismissed.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the denial of the city's motion for summary judgment under G. L. c. 21, § 17C, was immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution.
- Whether G. L. c. 21, § 17C, provides immunity from suit or merely an exemption from liability for ordinary negligence.
- Whether the city was entitled to summary judgment because Marcus did not personally pay the city a fee for use of McGrath Field.
- Whether the city's $1,200 charge was merely reimbursement for marginal costs directly attributable to the league's use of the field, rather than a charge or fee that defeated the statutory exemption.
Holdings
- The denial of the city's motion for summary judgment was not immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution because G. L. c. 21, § 17C, provides an exemption from liability for ordinary negligence, not immunity from suit.
- Section 17C does not provide an exemption from ordinary negligence liability when the landowner imposes a charge or fee for the particular recreational use of its land, even if the injured user did not personally or directly pay the fee to the landowner.
- The city was not entitled to summary judgment because it did not establish as a matter of law that the $1,200 payment was solely reimbursement for marginal costs directly attributable to the league's particular use of McGrath Field.
Key quotations
“In other words, where the landowner does not impose a fee or charge, § 17C merely provides an exemption from liability for ordinary negligence claims; it does not provide immunity from suit.” (462 Mass. at 153)
“That Marcus did not pay directly to the city its permit fee to reserve McGrath Field is not material.” (462 Mass. at 155)
“But the fact that the city used the permit fee received for general field upkeep is insufficient in itself to shield the city from ordinary negligence liability under § 17C (a).” (462 Mass. at 157)
Factual background
Marcus paid an $80 registration fee to Coed Jewish Sports to participate in a softball league. Coed Jewish Sports paid the City of Newton $1,200 for a permit reserving McGrath Field for league games during specified time blocks. While Marcus was playing in a league game on July 8, 2007, a tree from adjacent property fell and struck him, causing serious injuries. The city claimed that the $1,200 payment was used to defray general maintenance and administrative costs for the field.
Procedural history
Marcus sued the City of Newton and other defendants in the Superior Court after being injured by a falling tree while playing softball at McGrath Field. The city moved for summary judgment under G. L. c. 21, § 17C, but the Superior Court denied the motion because genuine issues of material fact remained. The city appealed, and the Supreme Judicial Court transferred the appeal from the Appeals Court on its own motion. The Supreme Judicial Court dismissed the city's appeal, concluding that the denial of summary judgment was not immediately appealable under the doctrine of present execution and that summary judgment was properly denied on the merits.