Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed Richard M. Boucher's convictions for murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty and related offenses arising from a shooting. The court held that the jury instructions properly allowed consideration of voluntary intoxication in determining whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner, and rejected the request to impose an additional intent requirement for that theory of murder. The court also declined to reduce the conviction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the jury instructions improperly limited consideration of evidence of voluntary intoxication or mental impairment to elements requiring knowledge or intent, thereby preventing the jury from considering that evidence in deciding whether the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- Whether Massachusetts law should require proof of an additional specific intent or knowledge element for murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should exercise its extraordinary power under G. L. c. 278, § 33E, to reduce the defendant's murder conviction to murder in the second degree.
Holdings
- An instruction on voluntary intoxication is erroneous if it links intoxication only to intent or knowledge without explaining that the jury may also consider intoxication in deciding whether the killing was committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty. The instruction here was adequate because it expressly directed the jury to consider the effect of alcohol consumption in determining whether the defendant acted in a cruel or atrocious manner, and the written clarification reinforced that direction.
- Massachusetts law does not require proof of an intent or knowledge beyond malice aforethought to convict a defendant of murder in the first degree on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty.
- The court found no reason to set aside or reduce the defendant's murder conviction under its extraordinary review authority.
Key quotations
“When the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty is in play, an instruction on voluntary intoxication that links consideration of intoxication only to a defendant's intent or knowledge, without also explaining that the jury may consider intoxication in relation to whether the defendant committed the killing with extreme atrocity or cruelty, is in error.” (at 10)
“proof of malice aforethought is the only requisite mental intent for a conviction of murder in the first degree based on murder committed with extreme atrocity or cruelty” (at 13)
Factual background
At a party in Plymouth, Richard Boucher, Jr., who had been drinking alcohol, argued with James Tigges and Jackson Duncan outside the residence. Boucher fired repeatedly at them from several feet away, shooting Duncan in the chest and shooting Tigges four times; Tigges died from his wounds and Duncan was paralyzed. Evidence concerning Boucher's intoxication was disputed, with some witnesses describing him as very drunk and others stating that he appeared normal.
Procedural history
Indictments were returned in the Superior Court Department on July 2, 2010. After a jury trial before Judge Raymond P. Veary, Jr., the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree on an extreme-atrocity-or-cruelty theory, as well as related assault and firearm offenses; he was acquitted of murder based on premeditation. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the judgments and declined to reduce the murder conviction under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.