Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction arising from the fatal shooting of a coworker. The court held that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary-manslaughter instruction based on sudden combat, that the reasonable-provocation and lesser-included-offense instructions were adequate, and that the challenged juror dismissal and admission of prior-bad-act evidence did not require reversal. The court also declined to grant relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence required an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on sudden combat.
- Whether the reasonable-provocation instruction was erroneous because it stated that threatening gestures, standing alone, do not constitute reasonable provocation.
- Whether the jury instructions improperly required an acquittal-first deliberation structure rather than allowing consideration of lesser included offenses before deciding the greater offense.
- Whether the trial judge properly dismissed an empanelled juror before deliberations because the juror disclosed that the defense expert's testimony caused her to relate the testimony to her own prior assault and possible psychiatric symptoms.
- Whether the trial judge abused his discretion by admitting evidence that Howard had previously been seen with what appeared to be a gun in his vehicle.
- Whether relief was warranted under the Supreme Judicial Court's extraordinary authority under G. L. c. 278, § 33E.
Holdings
- A sudden-combat instruction is required only when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, would permit a finding that the victim attacked the defendant or at least struck a blow against him. Because the evidence showed yelling and an advance but no attack, physical blow, or exchange of blows, the judge properly denied the instruction.
- The instruction that mere words or threatening gestures, standing alone, do not constitute reasonable provocation was not erroneous under the facts presented. Although words and gestures may in some circumstances combine to constitute adequate provocation, the record contained no evidence that Howard actually believed Ricketts was reaching for a weapon or otherwise presented circumstances sufficient to constitute provocation.
- The instructions did not create an impermissible acquittal-first structure. Massachusetts is a soft-transition jurisdiction, and the instructions, viewed as a whole, told the jury to consider mitigating circumstances and voluntary manslaughter before determining whether the Commonwealth had proved murder in the first degree.
- The trial judge acted within the statutory authority to discharge a nondeliberating juror in the best interests of justice. The juror's disclosure that the defense expert's testimony caused her to relate the testimony to her own experience and possible psychiatric symptoms provided a sufficient basis for dismissal.
- The evidence that Howard had previously been seen with what appeared to be a gun in his vehicle was admissible to rebut his statement that he began carrying a gun because he feared Ricketts. The limiting instruction was erroneous because it focused on improper purposes, including state of mind, but the error was harmless.
- After reviewing the entire trial record, the court found no reason to set aside the verdict or reduce the degree of guilt.
Key quotations
“"[S]udden combat is among those circumstances constituting reasonable provocation."” (58)
“"[V]ictim ... must attack the defendant or at least strike a blow against the defendant."” (59)
“The jury must be permitted to consider a lesser included offense prior to reaching a unanimous decision on the defendant's guilt or innocence of the greater offense.” (64)
“Evidence of a defendant's prior or subsequent bad acts is not admissible to show "bad character or criminal propensity"” (67)
“The focus of the trial was on the defendant's state of mind at the time of the shooting.” (68)
Factual background
Howard and Maurice Ricketts were coworkers who had previously engaged in workplace altercations. During an argument at work, Ricketts moved away from Howard after Howard drew a handgun and fired; Howard pursued him into a fenced yard and fired additional shots, including a fatal close-range shot to the back of Ricketts's head. Howard claimed that Ricketts had threatened and intimidated him, while the prosecution evidence showed no physical attack before the shooting. Howard later told police that he had carried a gun because he feared Ricketts, although evidence showed that he may have possessed a gun before Ricketts began working at the company.
Procedural history
A Superior Court jury convicted Howard of murder in the first degree on the theory of deliberate premeditation. The case was Howard's second trial; the Supreme Judicial Court had previously vacated his first murder conviction because of the erroneous admission of part of his statement after he invoked his right to remain silent. In the second direct appeal, Howard challenged jury instructions, dismissal of an empanelled juror, admission of prior bad-act evidence, and sought relief under G. L. c. 278, § 33E. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed and declined to reduce the verdict.