Edwards v. Commonwealth

477 Mass. 254 (2017) · Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · June 8, 2017 · No. SJC-12175

Summary

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court considered defamation claims brought by Saundra R. Edwards against former Governor Deval Patrick based on statements about her removal as chair of the Sex Offender Registry Board. The court held that Edwards had not pleaded sufficient facts to establish actual malice, and therefore the defamation claims should have been dismissed. The court did not decide whether a governor has an absolute privilege for statements made in the performance of official duties.

Court
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
Writing for the Court
Gaziano, J.; Gants, C.J.; Lenk, J.; Hines, J.; Lowy, J.
Jurisdiction
Massachusetts
Decision date
June 8, 2017
Docket number
SJC-12175
Procedural posture
Interlocutory appeal from the denial of Deval Patrick's Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss two defamation claims; the Supreme Judicial Court granted direct appellate review.
Standard of review
The denial of a motion to dismiss is reviewed de novo. The court accepts facts alleged in the complaint as true and draws reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, but disregards legal conclusions cast as factual allegations. The complaint must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.
Precedential value
Published, precedential opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
Parties
Deval Patrick v. Saundra R. Edwards
Disposition
reversed

Topics

defamationmotions to dismisspleadingsfirst amendmentcivil procedure

Practice areas

TortsCivil ProcedureConstitutional Law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Edwards's amended complaint pleaded sufficient facts to overcome the qualified or conditional privilege protecting Patrick's official statements to the media by establishing actual malice.
  2. Whether the Supreme Judicial Court should recognize an absolute privilege for a governor's statements made in the performance of official duties.

Holdings

  1. The amended complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish that Patrick knew his statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. Edwards's defamation claims therefore failed to overcome the qualified or conditional privilege applicable to Patrick's statements and should have been dismissed.
  2. The court did not decide whether a governor or other high-ranking state official enjoys an absolute privilege for statements made in the performance of official duties.

Key quotations

Reckless disregard requires more than negligence; a plaintiff must prove that the individual making the alleged defamatory statement "entertained serious doubts as to the truth" of the statement. (slip op. at 17-18)
Evidence of ill will or spite is insufficient, standing alone, to establish actual malice. (slip op. at 23)
That Patrick might have harbored ill will toward Edwards for "nearly destroy[ing]" the lives of some members of his family does not substitute for proof of actual malice. (slip op. at 23-24)

Factual background

Saundra Edwards served as chair of the Massachusetts Sex Offender Registry Board, a position held at the governor's pleasure, until Governor Deval Patrick replaced her in September 2014. After her removal, Patrick told the media that Edwards had inappropriately pressured a SORB hearing officer to change the outcome of a sex-offender-classification matter involving Patrick's brother-in-law. Edwards alleged that the statements were defamatory and that Patrick made them with actual malice, relying on statements by an administration official, the contents of a whistleblower lawsuit, and Patrick's alleged personal hostility toward her.

Procedural history

Edwards filed a Superior Court action against the Commonwealth for wrongful termination and against Patrick individually for defamation based on statements concerning her removal as chair of the Sex Offender Registry Board. After Edwards amended her complaint to add a second defamation claim, Patrick moved to dismiss on absolute- and qualified-privilege grounds. The Superior Court denied the motion, and the Supreme Judicial Court granted Patrick's application for direct appellate review.

Court Document

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