Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a person incarcerated in federal prison for failing to register as a sex offender may satisfy the standing requirement under G. L. c. 278A, § 2 (2), when the registration obligation arose from the conviction the person challenges. The court also held that an earlier chapter 278A motion denied without a hearing does not bar a subsequent motion because the first motion is effectively dismissed without prejudice. The court vacated the denial of Johnson’s second motion and remanded for consideration of whether he was otherwise entitled to a hearing.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether denial without a hearing of Johnson's first Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278A motion barred his second motion under principles of estoppel.
- Whether a person incarcerated in federal prison for failure to register as a sex offender has standing under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278A, section 2(2), when the registration duty arose from the conviction of the offense for which the person asserts factual innocence.
- Whether the case should be remanded for determination of Johnson's entitlement to a hearing under Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278A, section 7.
Holdings
- A chapter 278A motion that fails to satisfy threshold requirements and is denied without a hearing is effectively dismissed without prejudice; therefore, the denial of Johnson's first motion did not estop him from filing a second motion raising the same testing request.
- A person incarcerated in federal prison for failing to register as a sex offender has liberty restrained 'as the result of' a conviction under chapter 278A, section 2(2), when the registration obligation arose from the conviction for which the person asserts factual innocence and no other sex-offense conviction independently required registration.
- The court did not determine whether Johnson was ultimately entitled to DNA testing; it remanded for the Superior Court to consider whether he was otherwise entitled to a hearing under chapter 278A, section 7.
Key quotations
“That statute "allows those who have been convicted but assert factual innocence to have access to forensic and scientific testing of evidence and biological material that has the potential to prove their innocence."” (at 830-831)
“"We begin with the plain language of the statute."” (at 835)
“"We do not read into [a] statute a provision which the Legislature did not see fit to put there ...."” (at 835-836)
“"Given [the Legislature's] compelling interest in remedying wrongful convictions of factually innocent persons," "it is entirely appropriate that we construe the language of G. L. c. 278A, § [2 (2) ], in a manner that is generous to the moving party."” (at 836)
“Where a moving party is incarcerated for failing to register as a sex offender, his or her liberty has been restrained "as the result of" a conviction but for which he or she would not be incarcerated.” (at 846)
Factual background
Johnson was arrested in 1994 after a woman reported that she had been beaten and raped by one of two men. He pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and battery and one count of assault and battery, receiving a one-year house-of-correction sentence with credit for 229 days. Decades later, Johnson sought DNA testing of biological evidence related to the incident, while incarcerated in federal prison for failing to register as a sex offender; his duty to register arose from the 1994 sex-offense convictions, which he claimed were factually innocent.
Procedural history
Johnson pleaded guilty in 1994 to two counts of indecent assault and battery and one count of assault and battery. He later filed a chapter 278A motion seeking DNA testing; his first motion was denied without a hearing, and his second motion was likewise denied based on the Commonwealth's estoppel and standing arguments. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the first denial did not bar the second motion and that Johnson satisfied the statutory standing requirement, then vacated and remanded for consideration of whether he was otherwise entitled to a chapter 278A hearing.
Remand instructions
Vacate the order denying Johnson's second chapter 278A motion and remand to the Superior Court to consider whether Johnson is otherwise entitled to a hearing under G. L. c. 278A, § 7, including whether his motion satisfies the remaining statutory requirements.