Summary
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that, in postconviction resentencing proceedings under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30, a judge may permit a limited reciprocal psychiatric examination when the defendant relies on expert opinion substantially based on a personal psychological examination. The court concluded that the defendant had established a prima facie case for resentencing because his aggregate sentence was presumptively disproportionate under art. 26, and that the examination order was within the motion judge’s discretion. The court affirmed the single justice’s denial of relief.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 permits a judge to authorize a limited reciprocal psychiatric examination in a postconviction resentencing proceeding when the defendant relies on expert opinion substantially derived from a personal examination.
- Whether the motion judge abused her discretion by adapting procedures from Mass. R. Crim. P. 14.4 to govern the postconviction psychiatric examination.
- Whether the single justice erred or abused her discretion in denying Berry's petition under G. L. c. 211, § 3.
Holdings
- Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (c) (4) permits a judge, after a defendant makes a prima facie showing of entitlement to rule 30 relief, to authorize a limited reciprocal psychiatric examination when the defendant relies on expert opinion grounded substantially in a personal examination and clinical assessment of the defendant's psychological functioning or rehabilitation.
- An emerging adult's aggregate sentence for nonmurder offenses that delays parole eligibility beyond the parole eligibility applicable to an emerging adult convicted of murder is presumptively disproportionate under art. 26 and establishes a prima facie case for rule 30 relief.
- A motion judge may look to Mass. R. Crim. P. 14.4 for guidance and adapt its procedures to a rule 30 postconviction psychiatric examination; rule 14.4 is not an independent source of authority, because the authority derives from rule 30 (c) (4).
- The motion judge did not abuse her discretion or otherwise err in ordering the limited reciprocal psychiatric examination, and the single justice did not abuse her discretion or commit legal error in denying Berry's G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition.
Key quotations
“Where a defendant, in moving for postconviction relief, relies on expert opinion grounded in a personal examination, a judge may determine that a limited reciprocal examination is an appropriate form of discovery to assess the weight and credibility of that evidence.” (at 7-8)
“Our holding is limited. We do not suggest that a psychiatric examination is warranted whenever a defendant seeks resentencing or introduces generalized mitigation evidence.” (at 13-14)
“Here, the motion judge did not abuse her discretion or otherwise err in permitting the Commonwealth to obtain a psychiatric examination where there was a reasonable likelihood that the defendant would rely on psychological expert testimony derived from his own statements.” (at 16-17)
Factual background
Berry was twenty years old when he committed several nonmurder offenses, including shooting at police officers. He received an aggregate sentence requiring at least thirty-one years of incarceration before parole eligibility. In seeking resentencing under rule 30, Berry relied on a forensic psychologist's opinion based substantially on approximately seven hours of personal interviews concerning his mental health, rehabilitation, and risk of violence. After receiving that report, the Commonwealth sought and obtained an order for its own expert to conduct a reciprocal psychiatric examination.
Procedural history
Berry was convicted in 2005 of multiple nonmurder offenses and received consecutive sentences totaling thirty-one to forty-three years, with parole eligibility after thirty-one years. In 2024, he moved for resentencing under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 based on Commonwealth v. Mattis and submitted a psychological evaluation prepared after a personal examination. The Superior Court ordered a reciprocal examination by a Commonwealth expert. A single justice denied Berry's G. L. c. 211, § 3 petition, and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed that judgment.