United States v. Richard Clinton Allsup

566 F.2d 68 (9th Cir. 1977) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · December 19, 1977 · No. No. 77-1581

Summary

The Ninth Circuit reversed Richard Clinton Allsup's convictions for two bank robberies and remanded for a new trial based on cumulative trial errors. The court found inadequate voir dire regarding the insanity defense, improper refusal to excuse two bank employees for cause, and prejudicial judicial intervention during cross-examination of a prosecution witness. It upheld the denial of severance of the two robbery counts.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Hufstedler, Circuit Judge; Koelsch, Circuit Judge; Foley, District Judge, sitting by designation
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
December 19, 1977
Docket number
No. 77-1581
Procedural posture
Allsup appealed his federal convictions for two bank robberies, asserting multiple trial errors. The Ninth Circuit reviewed the convictions and ordered a new trial.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the denial of challenges for cause for legal error, the district court's intervention in witness examination for abuse of discretion subject to the requirement that the court avoid appearing to favor a party, and the refusal to sever counts for abuse of discretion.
Precedential value
Published Ninth Circuit opinion; precedential unless limited by subsequent authority.
Parties
Richard Clinton Allsup v. United States of America
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

jury selectioncriminal procedureappellate procedurestandard of reviewevidence

Practice areas

criminal procedureevidencejury selectionappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court conducted adequate voir dire concerning prospective jurors' ability to evaluate an insanity or lack-of-mental-capacity defense.
  2. Whether the district court erred by refusing to excuse two employees of the robbed bank for cause, thereby requiring the defense to use peremptory challenges.
  3. Whether the district court's intervention during cross-examination improperly rehabilitated a government identification witness and appeared to favor the prosecution.
  4. Whether the district court abused its discretion by refusing to sever the two bank-robbery counts.

Holdings

  1. A criminal defendant is entitled to have prospective jurors questioned about their ability objectively and fairly to evaluate evidence of insanity or lack of mental capacity. The district court erred by refusing to ask the requested question and could not condition such questioning on defense counsel's commitment to introduce insanity evidence.
  2. Prospective jurors who worked for the bank that was the victim of the charged robbery should have been excused for cause, notwithstanding their statements that they could decide the case fairly.
  3. Although a trial judge may question witnesses to clarify evidence and control the proceedings, the judge must avoid intervention that appears to aid one party. The district court's questioning improperly rehabilitated a government witness and gave her testimony potentially prejudicial additional persuasiveness.
  4. The district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever the two bank-robbery counts because the robberies were carried out in a similar manner and occurred within two weeks of one another.
  5. The cumulative effect of the inadequate insanity-related voir dire, the improper denial of challenges for cause, and the prejudicial judicial intervention denied Allsup a fair trial and required reversal and a new trial.

Key quotations

The district court cannot require a commitment to produce evidence relevant to an insanity defense as a condition precedent to interrogating jurors on voir dire about their reactions to a potential defense based on lack of mental capacity or insanity. (at 71)
The employment relationship coupled with a reasonable apprehension of violence by bank robbers leads us to believe that bias of those who work for the bank robbed should be presumed. (at 72)
The impact of the district court's interrogation was to destroy the effect of telling cross-examination, to rehabilitate the witness, and to give her testimony an extra and a potentially prejudicial persuasiveness. (at 73)

Factual background

Two Tucson banks were robbed in October 1976, approximately two weeks apart. Identification evidence concerning the first robbery was weak, while evidence concerning the second included bait money found on Allsup but also conflicting eyewitness identifications. Allsup presented substantial evidence concerning his mental capacity, making the insanity issue close for the jury. During trial, two prospective jurors disclosed that they worked for the robbed bank, and the trial judge intervened during cross-examination of a government identification witness whose testimony had changed.

Procedural history

Allsup was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona of two bank robberies under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He appealed, challenging the adequacy of voir dire concerning insanity, the denial of challenges for cause to two bank employees, the trial court's intervention during cross-examination of a government witness, and the refusal to sever the robbery counts. The Ninth Circuit found three errors whose cumulative effect denied a fair trial, while finding no abuse of discretion in refusing to sever the counts.

Remand instructions

The convictions were reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.

Court Document

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