United States v. Fred Eubanks, Eugene Martinez, Leroy Jones, Henry D. Yanez

4 Fed. R. Serv. 266 (9th Cir. 1979) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · March 12, 1979 · No. Nos. 77-3919, 77-3955, 77-4003, and 78-1032

Summary

The Ninth Circuit reversed the convictions of four defendants charged with heroin-distribution conspiracy offenses. The court held that the district court erred in denying a new trial based on juror bias, and it addressed jury instructions concerning multiple conspiracies and the admissibility of co-conspirator hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). The court concluded that some statements admitted through prosecution witness Gloria Baca were not shown to have been made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Per curiam; J. Ely; Patricia M. Hufstedler; C. William Kraft, Jr., sitting by designation
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
March 12, 1979
Docket number
Nos. 77-3919, 77-3955, 77-4003, and 78-1032
Procedural posture
Defendants appealed their jury convictions for conspiracy to distribute heroin and to possess heroin with intent to distribute. The Ninth Circuit reversed because the district court denied a new trial despite substantial juror bias and because the court failed to give a required multiple-conspiracies instruction and admitted some hearsay statements without an adequate foundation.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the denial of the motion for a new trial based on juror bias under the constitutional impartial-jury standard, and reviewed the challenged jury instructions and evidentiary rulings for legal error. The court noted that the decision whether to hold a juror-bias evidentiary hearing is within the trial court's discretion, subject to limits.
Precedential value
Published Ninth Circuit opinion; precedential
Parties
Fred Eubanks, Eugene Martinez, Leroy Jones, Henry D. Yanez v. United States of America
Disposition
reversed

Topics

jury selectionjury instructionsconspiracyhearsaysixth amendment

Practice areas

criminal procedureevidenceconstitutional lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the defendants were entitled to a new trial because juror Collins' undisclosed family history created unconstitutional bias.
  2. Whether the district court was required to instruct the jury on the possibility of multiple conspiracies and the treatment of evidence relating to separate conspiracies.
  3. Whether statements related by Gloria Baca were admissible under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.
  4. Whether the trial judge, rather than the jury, was required to determine whether the foundation for admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) had been established.

Holdings

  1. A juror's two sons serving lengthy prison terms for heroin-related crimes created such a potential for substantial emotional involvement that the juror could not be treated as impartial in a heroin-trafficking prosecution. The district court therefore erred in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial.
  2. A defendant denied the constitutional right to an impartial jury need not show that the biased juror actually caused or influenced the guilty verdict.
  3. When the trial evidence permits the jury to find multiple conspiracies rather than the single conspiracy charged, the court must instruct the jury on that possibility and provide an appropriate limiting instruction concerning evidence relating to other conspiracies.
  4. A statement is admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) only when it was made during the pendency of the conspiracy, in furtherance of the conspiracy, and there is independent proof of the conspiracy and of the declarant's and defendant's connection to it.
  5. The trial judge, not the jury, must initially determine whether a sufficient foundation exists for admission of a statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(E).

Key quotations

Regardless of what role Collins played during jury deliberations, appellants were denied their constitutional right to an impartial jury by his presence on the panel. (517)
If it is possible under the evidence for the jury to find that multiple conspiracies existed, then the court should instruct the jury on the issue. (518)
It is the responsibility of the judge, rather than the jury, to determine whether a sufficient foundation has been established for declarations to be admissible under the co-conspirator exception. (519)
For declarations to be admissible under the co-conspirator exception, they must further the common objectives of the conspiracy. (520)

Factual background

The defendants were prosecuted in a joint trial for a heroin-distribution conspiracy. Juror Collins failed to disclose that he had two sons serving long prison terms for murder and robbery arising from efforts to obtain heroin, and the defense did not learn of that background until after trial. The prosecution presented testimony from Gloria Baca concerning the defendants' conduct and statements by alleged conspirators, including statements by her deceased common-law husband, Luis Gonzales, Jr. The evidence also permitted possible findings of either one broad conspiracy or several smaller conspiracies.

Procedural history

The defendants and three others were jointly indicted, tried, and convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. After trial, defense counsel learned that juror Collins had two sons serving lengthy prison terms for heroin-related crimes and had failed to disclose relevant information during voir dire. The district court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial, and the defendants appealed. The Ninth Circuit reversed and addressed the jury-instruction and hearsay issues likely to recur on retrial.

Remand instructions

The convictions were reversed for retrial. On retrial, the court should give a correct multiple-conspiracies instruction and an appropriate limiting instruction if the evidence permits a finding of multiple conspiracies. The court must determine the foundational facts for Rule 801(d)(2)(E) before admitting coconspirator statements; the prosecution may present additional evidence supporting the required inference that statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Court Document

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