Herrington v. County of Sonoma

834 F.2d 1488 (9th Cir. 1987) · United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · December 24, 1987

Summary

The Ninth Circuit reviewed constitutional claims arising from Sonoma County’s rejection of a proposed subdivision and subsequent downzoning of the plaintiffs’ property. The court held that the plaintiffs’ procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection claims were ripe and upheld the liability determination and injunctive relief. It vacated the $2,500,600 damages award as grossly excessive and remanded for a new trial on damages.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Choy, Senior Circuit Judge; Choy; Sneed; Tang
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
December 24, 1987
Procedural posture
The County appealed a judgment entered after a jury trial finding constitutional liability and awarding $2,500,600 in damages. The Herringtons cross-appealed the denial of prejudgment interest.
Standard of review
Ripeness was reviewed de novo. The failure to disqualify the trial judge was reviewed for abuse of discretion. Because the County failed to renew its directed-verdict motion, review of the liability evidence was limited to whether any evidence supported the verdict or whether plain error caused a manifest miscarriage of justice. The damages award was reviewed for gross excessiveness.
Precedential value
published precedential federal appellate opinion
Parties
County of Sonoma v. John Herrington, David Herrington
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

section 1983procedural due processsubstantive due processequal protectionzoning

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightsreal estatemunicipal lawremedies

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Herringtons' procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection claims were ripe despite the absence of a variance application or a less intensive alternative development application.
  2. Whether the County could challenge on appeal the submission of constitutional liability issues to the jury after agreeing to the jury instructions without objection.
  3. Whether the County was entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict after failing to renew its directed-verdict motion at the close of all evidence.
  4. Whether any evidence supported the jury's general liability verdict under the applicable deferential standard.
  5. Whether the trial judge's prior ownership of Sonoma County property and retained security interest required disqualification or a new trial.
  6. Whether the $2,500,600 damages award was grossly excessive and cumulative.
  7. Whether the Herringtons were entitled to prejudgment interest from the date of the verdict to entry of judgment.

Holdings

  1. The Herringtons' procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection claims were ripe. They had obtained a conclusively rejected development proposal, and pursuing a formally complete application or variance would have been futile based on repeated, uncontradicted testimony from County officials.
  2. The County waived its argument that the constitutional liability issues should not have been submitted to the jury because it agreed without reservation to the submission and failed to object below.
  3. The County was precluded from obtaining judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it failed to renew its directed-verdict motion at the close of all the evidence.
  4. The liability verdict had to stand because the record contained evidence supporting each submitted theory of liability and did not show an absolute absence of evidence or plain error causing a manifest miscarriage of justice.
  5. Judge Weigel's former ownership of Sonoma County property and retained security interest did not establish actual or apparent bias or a disqualifying financial interest, so the district court properly denied the motion for a new trial based on judicial bias.
  6. The $2,500,600 damages award was grossly excessive and cumulative, shocked the conscience, and had to be vacated and retried.

Key quotations

ripeness is a question of law which must be determined by the court. (1494)
In sum, we hold that the Herringtons have satisfied the “final decision” ripeness requirement enunciated in Kinzli. (1496-97)
The MacDonald reapplication requirement is not applicable to this case because no taking by inverse condemnation has been alleged. (1499)
The requirement that the motion be made at the close of all the evidence is to be strictly observed. (1500)
We conclude that Judge Weigel had no financial interest in the outcome of the Herrington lawsuit. (1503)
But the jury’s award of damages is so grossly excessive as to shock the conscience. (1507)

Factual background

The Herringtons owned a 540-acre Sonoma County property and spent several years working with County planning staff on a residential subdivision proposal, ultimately submitting a proposed 32-unit development. County staff found the proposal inconsistent with the General Plan, although the Planning Commission initially found it consistent; the Board of Supervisors later rejected it, and the County adopted a Specific Plan downzoning the property to 100-acre minimum lots. The Herringtons alleged inadequate notice and opportunity to be heard, manipulation or misrepresentation of planning materials, arbitrary decisionmaking, and disparate treatment compared with other agricultural properties. The jury found constitutional liability and awarded $2,500,600, while the district court separately invalidated the County's inconsistency determination.

Procedural history

The Herringtons sued Sonoma County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after the County rejected their proposed 32-unit subdivision as inconsistent with the General Plan and later downzoned their property. They abandoned their takings claim at trial and proceeded on procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection theories. The jury returned a general verdict for the Herringtons and awarded damages; the district court entered injunctive relief invalidating the inconsistency determination and denied the County's post-trial motions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the liability-related relief, vacated the damages award as grossly excessive and cumulative, and remanded for a new damages trial.

Remand instructions

Vacate the damages portion of the judgment and conduct a new trial limited to damages. The injunctive order invalidating the County's inconsistency determination remains affirmed. The request for appellate attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was denied.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…