Johnston v. Horne

Summary

The Ninth Circuit reviewed claims by a federally employed toolmaker alleging disability discrimination and retaliation under the Rehabilitation Act, Privacy Act violations, and constitutional violations arising from his medical retirement and removal from a naval shipyard. The court held that the plaintiff’s § 501 claim was jurisdictionally barred for failure to name the proper defendant within the statutory period, that no private cause of action existed under § 504 against a federal employer, and that the retaliation claim failed for lack of causation. It affirmed judgment on the Privacy Act claim and dismissal of the constitutional claims, including the Bivens claims.

Holdings

1. Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act provides a private cause of action for a federal employee, but the action must name the appropriate head of the department, agency, or unit within the statutory thirty-day period. Johnston's failure to name the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary's lack of timely notice deprived the district court of jurisdiction; Rule 15(c) could not cure the defect.
2. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act does not create a private cause of action for a federal employee alleging handicap discrimination by a federal employer; section 501 is the exclusive remedy for such claims.
3. Johnston failed to establish the causal connection required for a prima facie Title VII retaliation claim because the evidence supported the finding that his medical retirement resulted from paranoia rather than his EEOC complaint.
4. A Privacy Act damages claim requires proof that an agency violated the accuracy or dissemination requirements, that the violation proximately caused an adverse effect, that the agency acted willfully or intentionally, and that the plaintiff suffered actual damages. Willful or intentional conduct requires more than gross negligence. Johnston failed to prove conduct exceeding that standard.
5. A supervisor's private notes generally are not subject to the Privacy Act, but they may become subject to the Act if the agency uses them to make employment decisions. Johnston had no claim because the district court found that the notes were not used in his retirement decision and had been destroyed beforehand.
6. A federal civil servant may not pursue a Bivens damages action for constitutional violations that can be adequately addressed through the statutory and administrative scheme governing federal employment.
7. A Bivens damages claim against a federal official in an individual capacity requires personal service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1). Johnston's claim against McNellis failed for lack of personal service, and his claim against the security guards was barred by Washington's three-year residual statute of limitations because the amended complaint did not relate back.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a federal employee has a private cause of action against a federal employer under section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act and, if so, whether Johnston timely named the proper defendant.
2. Whether a federal employee may bring a private handicap-discrimination action against a federal employer under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
3. Whether Johnston established a causal connection between his EEOC complaint and his medical retirement sufficient to support a Title VII retaliation claim.
4. Whether the Shipyard violated the Privacy Act by maintaining or disseminating inaccurate records or by failing to provide access to a supervisor's notes.
5. Whether Johnston's Bivens due process claim was barred by available statutory and administrative remedies.
6. Whether Johnston's Bivens Fourth Amendment claim against Shipyard personnel was barred by lack of personal service and the statute of limitations.

Disposition

other