Summary
The Ninth Circuit held that cetaceans lack standing in their own names to sue under the Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection Act, National Environmental Policy Act, and Administrative Procedure Act. The court concluded that these statutes authorize persons or entities, but not animals, to bring suit, and that the Cetacean Community could not establish associational standing. The court affirmed dismissal of the action against the President and Secretary of Defense challenging the Navy's use of SURTASS low-frequency active sonar during wartime or heightened threat conditions.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether cetaceans may sue in their own names under the Endangered Species Act.
- Whether cetaceans may sue in their own names under the Marine Mammal Protection Act.
- Whether cetaceans may sue in their own names to enforce the National Environmental Policy Act through the Administrative Procedure Act.
- Whether the Cetacean Community could establish associational or organizational standing under the Administrative Procedure Act.
- Whether the statements in Palila v. Hawaii Department of Land and Natural Resources, 852 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1988), constituted binding precedent that animals have standing to sue in their own names.
Holdings
- Palila IV's statements that the Palila bird was a plaintiff in its own right were nonbinding dicta, not a holding that an endangered species has standing to sue under the ESA.
- Article III does not itself prevent Congress from authorizing suits in the name of an animal, but an animal plaintiff must still be granted standing by statute and satisfy Article III.
- The ESA does not grant animals statutory standing to sue in their own names to enforce the statute.
- The APA does not grant animals standing because its definition of person does not include animals, even when the underlying statute is interpreted broadly.
- Animals do not have standing to enforce the MMPA's permit or letter-of-authorization requirements.
- Animals do not have standing to sue in their own names to enforce NEPA.
- The Cetacean Community could not establish associational or first-party organizational standing under the APA.
Key quotations
“We hold that cetaceans do not have standing under these statutes.” (¶ 1)
“In context, our statements in Palila IV were little more than rhetorical flourishes.” (¶ 15)
“Animals are not authorized to sue in their own names to protect themselves.” (¶ 38)
“In the absence of any such statement in the ESA, the MMPA, or NEPA, or the APA, we conclude that the Cetaceans do not have statutory standing to sue.” (¶ 44)
Factual background
The Cetacean Community was a name selected by a self-appointed attorney purporting to represent the world's whales, porpoises, and dolphins. The group challenged the United States Navy's use of SURTASS LFAS during wartime or heightened-threat conditions, alleging that the sonar could cause tissue damage and disrupt feeding, mating, and other biologically important behaviors. It sought an injunction requiring statutory consultation, permitting, and environmental-impact review, as well as an injunction against sonar use until those requirements were satisfied.
Procedural history
The Cetacean Community sought injunctive relief requiring the President and Secretary of Defense to undertake consultation, permitting, and environmental-impact-review procedures concerning wartime or heightened-threat use of SURTASS LFAS. The District of Hawaii granted defendants' motion to dismiss, without specifying whether dismissal rested on Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reviewed the standing decision de novo, held that the Cetaceans lacked statutory standing, and affirmed dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).