Summary
The Ninth Circuit affirmed suppression of evidence obtained during a warrantless search of an apartment entered by parolee Lambert Grandberry. The court held that Ninth Circuit precedent requiring probable cause that a parolee resides at a searched residence remained binding after Samson v. California, and that the officers’ observations did not establish probable cause that Grandberry lived at the apartment. The court also rejected reliance on the parole condition authorizing searches of property under Grandberry’s control.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Samson v. California displaced Ninth Circuit precedent requiring officers to have probable cause to believe that a parolee lives at a residence before conducting a warrantless search of that residence pursuant to a parole search condition.
- Whether the officers had probable cause to believe that Grandberry lived at the Arlington Avenue apartment.
- Whether a parole condition permitting searches of the parolee's residence and any property under the parolee's control authorized a warrantless search of a residence where the officers lacked probable cause to believe that the parolee lived there.
Holdings
- Samson did not clearly irreconcilably conflict with the Ninth Circuit's rule that officers must have probable cause to believe a parolee lives at a residence before conducting a warrantless search of that residence under a parole search condition. A three-judge panel therefore remained bound by the Motley/Howard rule.
- The officers lacked probable cause to conclude that Grandberry lived at the Arlington apartment. His repeated presence and use of a key, considered with the other circumstances, did not satisfy the Ninth Circuit's relatively stringent probable-cause-as-to-residence standard.
- Where it is clear that the searched property is a residence, a parole condition authorizing searches of the parolee's residence and any property under the parolee's control is triggered only when officers have probable cause to believe that the parolee lives there. The property-under-control provision cannot be used as a loophole around the probable-cause-as-to-residence requirement.
Key quotations
“Reading “property under . . . control” to include residences would render the separate “your residence” term a nullity.” (982)
“We conclude that where, as here, it is abundantly clear that the searched property is a residence, a parole condition permitting searches of “your residence and any property under your control” is triggered only when the officers have probable cause that the parolee lives at a residence.” (983)
Factual background
Police investigating suspected crack-cocaine sales observed Grandberry visit an Arlington Avenue apartment approximately six to ten times over roughly two weeks and enter the building with keys. Grandberry had consistently reported a different address, on South Manhattan Place, to his parole officer and the California DMV, and officers conducted only cursory surveillance of that address. Without obtaining a warrant, officers used Grandberry's keys to enter the Arlington apartment, where they found crack cocaine, a loaded firearm, male clothing, and mail addressed to Grandberry at the South Manhattan Place address.
Procedural history
A federal grand jury indicted Grandberry for crack-cocaine distribution, crack-cocaine possession, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The district court initially denied suppression, later reconsidered and suppressed cocaine and a firearm found in an Arlington Avenue apartment, and the government appealed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the suppression ruling and remanded for further proceedings.
Remand instructions
The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings after affirmance of the order suppressing evidence found in the Arlington apartment.