Gregory L. Brown v. W. Muniz

Summary

The Ninth Circuit held that Brady claims are subject to AEDPA's second-or-successive gatekeeping requirements because the factual predicate—the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial—exists at the time of the first habeas petition. The court affirmed dismissal of Brown's second-in-time habeas petition and denied his application for leave to file, finding that the alleged Brady evidence (impeachment material on three officers with tangential involvement) did not establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B).

Holdings

1. Brady claims are subject to AEDPA's second or successive gatekeeping requirements because the factual predicate supporting a Brady claim – the state's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence before trial – exists at the time of the first habeas petition.
2. Brown fails to make a prima facie showing of actual innocence because the alleged Brady material regarding officers Hockett, Hutchings, and Gin is not material and does not undermine confidence in the verdict.

Questions Presented

1. Whether a second-in-time habeas petition based on a Brady claim is subject to AEDPA's second or successive gatekeeping requirements.
2. Whether Brown made a prima facie showing of actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence.

Disposition

affirmed