Anna Galaza v. Alejandro Mayorkas

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit · February 28, 2023 · No. No. 21-15464

Summary

The Ninth Circuit held that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) preempts the Rehabilitation Act for TSA security screeners, affirming dismissal of a disability discrimination claim. Central to the holding is the ATSA's "notwithstanding any other provision of law" language, which gives the TSA Administrator authority to set employment standards for screeners without regard to the Rehabilitation Act. The court joined the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in this conclusion. Underlying topics: ATSA preemption, Rehabilitation Act applicability, and TSA screener employment standards.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Writing for the Court
Johnnie B. Rawlinson; Bridget S. Bade; Daniel A. Bress
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
February 28, 2023
Docket number
No. 21-15464
Procedural posture
Appeal from the dismissal of a Rehabilitation Act claim on preemption grounds.
Standard of review
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6).
Precedential value
published
Parties
Anna Galaza v. Alejandro Mayorkas
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

preemptionstatutory interpretationfederal employee discriminationfederal employment lawadministrative law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) preempts the Rehabilitation Act as applied to TSA security screeners.

Holdings

  1. The ATSA preempts the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, as applicable to security screeners, because the 'notwithstanding any other provision of law' clauses in the ATSA reflect legislative intent to override conflicting provisions of the Rehabilitation Act.

Key quotations

we join the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits in holding that the ATSA preempts the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794, as applicable to security screeners. (at 4)
[N]otwithstanding any other provision of law, the [Administrator of the Transportation Security Administration] may employ, appoint, discipline, terminate, and fix the compensation, terms, and conditions of employment of Federal service for such a number of individuals as the [Administrator] determines to be necessary to carry out the screening functions [required by the Act]. (at 7)

Factual background

Galaza suffered two injuries while working for the TSA as a Transportation Security Officer (screener). After her second injury, she was absent from work until her doctor cleared her to return to a permanent limited-duty position. After undergoing vocational rehabilitation, she remained unable to fulfill the duties of a TSA screener and was terminated from employment. She alleged that she was terminated due to her disability despite the availability of limited duty positions such as exit lane monitor, secondary ticket checker, or bypass door monitor.

Procedural history

Galaza filed a complaint with TSA's Equal Employment Opportunity Office and subsequently filed an action in federal district court. The district court dismissed all of Galaza's claims, including her Rehabilitation Act claim, on the ground that the ATSA preempted the Rehabilitation Act. Galaza appealed, but the first appeal was dismissed because she voluntarily dismissed claims without obtaining a final judgment. She later obtained a final appealable judgment and appealed again.

Court Document

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