Summary
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Andrew Teter’s motion for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). The court concluded that Teter was not a prevailing party because the prior panel decision favorable to him had been vacated and the en banc court dismissed the case as moot after Hawaii amended the challenged butterfly-knife statute. Judges Miller, Collins, and VanDyke filed separate concurrences addressing the mootness ruling, the effect of Lackey v. Stinnie, and the Ninth Circuit’s practice of automatically vacating panel opinions upon rehearing en banc.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether plaintiffs were prevailing parties entitled to attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) after the favorable panel decision was vacated and the en banc court dismissed the case as moot following legislative amendment of the challenged statute.
- Whether the Supreme Court's decision in Lackey v. Stinnie changed the mootness analysis applied in the prior en banc decision.
- Whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to vacate the prior vacatur order and reinstate the panel's merits judgment after the mandate had issued and the case had become moot.
Holdings
- Plaintiffs were not prevailing parties and were not entitled to attorney's fees because they did not obtain enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially altered the legal relationship between the parties. The favorable three-judge panel decision had been vacated, and the en banc court dismissed the case as moot.
- Lackey did not change the Ninth Circuit's mootness analysis because it did not decide whether legislative repeal mooted the case before it; it assumed mootness based on the parties' agreement and reiterated principles from voluntary-cessation cases.
- The court lacked jurisdiction to enter an order resolving the merits or otherwise reinstate the vacated panel judgment because the case was moot and the mandate had issued.
Key quotations
“a plaintiff ‘prevails’ under the statute when a court conclusively resolves a claim by granting enduring judicial relief on the merits that materially alters the legal relationship between the parties.” (135 F.4th at 1177)
“the repeal, amendment, or expiration of challenged legislation is generally enough to render a case moot.” (135 F.4th at 1178)
“But because this case is moot, we lack jurisdiction to enter such an order.” (135 F.4th at 1180)
Factual background
Plaintiffs challenged a Hawaii statute prohibiting butterfly knives under the Second Amendment. During the litigation, the Hawaii Legislature amended the challenged statute, and the en banc Ninth Circuit determined in its prior decision that the amendment gave plaintiffs everything they sought and made the case moot. Because the panel decision favorable to plaintiffs had been vacated and the case was dismissed as moot, plaintiffs sought attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b).
Procedural history
The district court entered summary judgment for the Hawaii Attorney General and the Hawaii Sheriff Division Administrator. A three-judge Ninth Circuit panel later ruled for plaintiffs on the merits, but that opinion was vacated upon rehearing en banc. The en banc court concluded that legislative amendment of the challenged statute rendered the case moot, vacated the district court's order, and remanded. In this order, the en banc court unanimously denied plaintiffs' motion for attorney's fees.