Summary
The Ninth Circuit denied Luis Guillermo Gonzalez-Juarez’s petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision finding him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court held that substantial evidence governs review of the primarily factual mixed question whether removal would cause “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, and concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- What standard of review applies to the agency's determination that removal would not cause exceptional and extremely unusual hardship under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D)?
- What does the statutory phrase exceptional and extremely unusual hardship require?
- Whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that Gonzalez-Juarez failed to establish the required hardship to his qualifying sons.
- Whether the BIA adequately considered the evidence concerning country conditions, finances, education, language fluency, health, and family separation.
Holdings
- The substantial evidence standard applies when reviewing the primarily factual mixed question whether an alien has established exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D).
- The hardship required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) must be out of the ordinary, exceedingly uncommon, and extreme in comparison with the hardship ordinarily resulting from an alien's removal.
- Substantial evidence supported the BIA's conclusion that Gonzalez-Juarez failed to establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying sons.
Key quotations
“Accordingly, we implement Wilkinson’s directive to apply a deferential standard of review to the primarily factual mixed question at hand—whether the BIA erred in applying the exceptional and extremely unusual hardship standard to a given set of facts—by reviewing for substantial evidence.” (p. 13)
“Drawing from the dictionary definitions, then, the hardship must be out of the ordinary and exceedingly uncommon. It must deviate, in the extreme, from the norm.” (p. 18)
“Because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Gonzalez failed to demonstrate exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to his qualifying relatives, the BIA did not err when it denied his application for cancellation of removal.” (p. 23)
Factual background
Gonzalez-Juarez, a native and citizen of Mexico who most recently entered the United States in 1999, conceded removability and sought cancellation of removal. He had two qualifying sons, ages fifteen and eighteen, who planned to accompany him and their mother to Mexico; the sons spoke some but not fluent Spanish, and one had eczema treated with a topical cream. The immigration judge granted cancellation based primarily on country-conditions reports concerning crime and violence in Mexico, but the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, finding that the evidence did not establish exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.
Procedural history
Gonzalez-Juarez conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal. The immigration judge granted the application, but the Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, concluding that he had not established exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to qualifying relatives. The Ninth Circuit denied his petition for review.