Summary
The Ninth Circuit reviewed a district court's judgment in a Section 1983 action brought by a parent against a school district and its principal for banning her from school premises following an altercation. The panel affirmed the grant of qualified immunity to the principal on the First Amendment retaliation claim and upheld the dismissal of the procedural due process claim. However, it reversed the district court's judgment on the plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim against the school district, finding that an official policy barring "offensive or inappropriate" speech was unconstitutional and could have motivated the ban. The court also partially reversed on a state law defamation claim.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court erred in granting judgment as a matter of law on Hartzell's First Amendment retaliation claim against the District.
- Whether the district court properly excluded Hartzell's final‑policymaker Monell theory.
- Whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on the Monell custom‑and‑practice theory.
- Whether Andrea Divijak is entitled to qualified immunity on the First Amendment retaliation claim.
- Whether Hartzell has a protected procedural due‑process liberty interest in directing her children’s education.
- Whether Hartzell's defamation claim against Divijak is viable based on the first document sent to her employer.
Holdings
- The district court erred; the First Amendment retaliation claim against the District is viable because the District's Policy KFA, which bans "speech ... offensive or inappropriate," is unconstitutional when applied to Hartzell and a reasonable jury could find the ban was based on that policy.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion; Hartzell failed to disclose a final‑policymaker theory in the joint pre‑trial order, so the theory was properly excluded.
- The district court’s judgment was affirmed; Hartzell did not establish a longstanding custom or practice of retaliation sufficient for Monell liability.
- The district court’s grant of qualified immunity was affirmed; the right was not clearly established at the time of the incident.
- The district court’s judgment was affirmed; Hartzell did not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in directing her children’s education that would trigger procedural due‑process protections.
- The district court’s summary‑judgment dismissal was reversed in part; the claim is viable as to the first document because it contains false statements of fact that could be defamatory.
Key quotations
“If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”
“The District’s official policy of barring speech that was “offensive or inappropriate” was unconstitutional and a reasonable jury could conclude that Hartzell was banned from the school grounds based on this policy, rather than because of her alleged assault on Divijak.”
Factual background
On February 7, 2020, after a school event at Dove Mountain K‑8, Rebecca Hartzell approached principal Andrea Divijak, made a sarcastic comment, and was alleged to have touched Divijak's wrist. School officials ordered Hartzell to leave the premises and issued a trespass warning that remained in effect. The District later lifted the order in June 2023. Hartzell sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 for First Amendment retaliation, procedural due process, and defamation.
Procedural history
The district court entered summary judgment for the District and Divijak on the First Amendment retaliation claim, the Monell claims, the qualified‑immunity claim, the procedural due‑process claim, and on the defamation claim to the extent it was based on the second document. The plaintiff appealed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on the First Amendment claim against the District, the exclusion of the final‑policymaker theory, the qualified‑immunity ruling for Divijak, the procedural due‑process ruling, and the partial summary‑judgment dismissal of the defamation claim.
Remand instructions
Retrial of the First Amendment retaliation claim against the District based on Policy KFA and of the defamation claim against Divijak limited to the first document; the §1983 Monell claim against the District based on the final‑policymaker theory remains barred.