Summary
This Ninth Circuit opinion reverses a district court's grant of judgment on the pleadings in a prisoner's Bivens action alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Eighth Amendment. Applying the two-step framework from Ziglar v. Abbasi, the panel held that the plaintiff's claim is identical in all meaningful respects to the Supreme Court's precedent in Carlson v. Green, meaning the Prison Litigation Reform Act and Bureau of Prisons' Administrative Remedy Program do not create a new context at step one. The court further found that the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiff leave to amend his complaint without adequate written findings. Consequently, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with the court's ruling on the cognizability of the Bivens claim.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Schwartz's Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim against federal prison medical officials arises in the same Bivens context recognized in Carlson v. Green or instead presents a new context requiring analysis of special factors.
- Whether the Prison Litigation Reform Act constitutes a special factor creating a new Bivens context at step one of the Ziglar framework.
- Whether the Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program or the chronicity and alleged lesser severity of Schwartz's medical condition materially distinguish his claim from Carlson at step one.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Schwartz leave to amend without adequate written findings or a clear basis in the record.
Holdings
- Schwartz's claim is identical in all meaningful respects to the Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim recognized in Carlson v. Green. Because the claim arises in the same Bivens context, it is cognizable and no step-two special-factors analysis is required.
- The PLRA is not a step-one special factor creating a new Bivens context because it did not eliminate existing Bivens causes of action; it governs those claims and may be relevant only at step two when a court considers extending Bivens to a new context.
- The Bureau of Prisons Administrative Remedy Program was not a meaningful difference at step one because it existed when Carlson was decided, and the chronicity or lesser severity of Schwartz's medical condition does not distinguish his claim from Carlson.
- The district court abused its discretion by denying Schwartz leave to amend without adequately explaining its findings of undue delay, prejudice, and futility and without a clear basis in the record.
Key quotations
“Because Schwartz’s claims arise in the same context as Carlson, they are cognizable under Bivens. No step two analysis is required.” (at 22)
“Because the PLRA did not foreclose Carlson claims but was instead intended to govern them, it is only relevant at step two of the Bivens analysis.” (at 13–14)
“If a district court denies a motion for leave to amend, the record must “clearly indicate[] reasons for the district court’s denial,” or the court must “provide written findings” of “prejudice to the opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, or futility of amendment.”” (at 23)
Factual background
While incarcerated at FCI-Tucson, Paul Schwartz experienced numerous serious symptoms over approximately eighteen months, including tachycardia, blood in his urine, severe thyroid dysfunction, chest pain, tremors, shortness of breath, and substantial weight loss. He alleged that prison medical personnel delayed diagnostic testing and medication, failed to provide necessary treatment, denied him access to physicians, and ignored repeated requests for care. He further alleged that the deficient treatment caused irreversible kidney injury and threatened additional heart, kidney, and liver problems.
Procedural history
Schwartz filed a pro se complaint in 2014 concerning allegedly inadequate medical treatment at FCI-Tucson. The district court dismissed several defendants sua sponte, dismissed Miller, and later granted summary judgment to Longfellow and Tatad. The Ninth Circuit reversed as to Tatad in a prior appeal. On remand, the district court denied Schwartz leave to amend and later granted Tatad's motion for judgment on the pleadings after reconsideration, concluding that the PLRA created a new Bivens context and foreclosed a damages remedy. The Ninth Circuit reversed.
Remand instructions
The judgment on the pleadings is reversed, and the denial of leave to amend is reversed. Schwartz's Carlson-based Bivens claims may proceed; the district court must reconsider the amendment request under Rule 15(a)(2) with adequate findings and a clear record basis.