Summary
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of Tracy Allen Hampton’s federal habeas petition challenging his Arizona murder convictions and death sentences. The panel rejected claims involving alleged Brady and Napue violations, ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of evidentiary development, and declined to expand the certificate of appealability. Judge Friedland dissented, concluding that trial counsel were constitutionally ineffective for failing to present witnesses supporting third-party culpability and impeachment of a key prosecution witness.
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Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose George Ridley's presentence investigation report and its impeachment material.
- Whether the State violated Napue v. Illinois by knowingly presenting or failing to correct allegedly false testimony by Ridley concerning violence against his ex-wife.
- Whether trial counsel were ineffective for failing to obtain and use Ridley's presentence investigation report.
- Whether trial counsel were ineffective during the guilt phase for failing to present additional third-party-culpability witnesses and related evidence.
- Whether trial counsel were ineffective during the sentencing phase for failing to present additional mental-health and mitigation evidence.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying evidentiary development on Hampton's habeas claims.
- Whether Hampton made the substantial showing required to expand the certificate of appealability to his uncertified claims.
Holdings
- Assuming the State suppressed Ridley's presentence investigation report before or during the guilt phase, the report was not material under Brady because it supplied cumulative impeachment of a witness who had already been extensively impeached and because there was no reasonable probability of a different verdict.
- Hampton failed to establish a Brady violation during the sentencing phase because the report had become publicly available and defense counsel knew or should have known the essential facts necessary to obtain and use it.
- Hampton did not establish a Napue violation because he failed to show that Ridley's testimony was actually false or that the prosecution knew it was false; alternatively, any false testimony was immaterial.
- The ineffective-assistance claim failed because Hampton could not establish prejudice under Strickland.
- The state post-conviction court reasonably applied Strickland and reasonably determined the facts in rejecting Hampton's claim that counsel were ineffective for failing to call additional witnesses or present related evidence.
- The state post-conviction court reasonably determined that counsel's investigation and strategic decision not to present additional mental-health experts did not constitute constitutionally deficient performance.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hampton's request for evidentiary development.
- The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to Hampton's uncertified claims because he did not make a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Key quotations
“AEDPA “guard[s] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems”—it is not “a means of error correction.”” (13-14)
“In cases like this one, where a witness has been thoroughly impeached and there is direct evidence of guilt from other sources, the defendant must show a “reasonable likelihood” that the witness’s false testimony “had an effect on the outcome of the trial” despite other evidence of his involvement in the charged crime.” (34)
“Our review, however, is “limited to the record that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the merits.”” (42)
“So a “new” IAC claim under Dickens never gets off the ground—both because the new evidence is excluded from merits review and because a prisoner cannot use that evidence under Martinez to excuse a procedural default and capitalize on the de novo review that Dickens would have allowed.” (45)
“For the dissent to be right, it must be true that there is not a single reasonable argument—not one—that Hampton’s counsel performed adequately at the guilt phase.” (53)
Factual background
Hampton was convicted of shooting Charles Findley and Tanya Ramsdell at a Phoenix residence; Ramsdell was five months pregnant, and her unborn child also died. The prosecution relied principally on eyewitness Misty Ross and jailhouse informant George Ridley, who testified that Hampton confessed repeatedly. Hampton's defense argued that drug dealer Tim Wallace committed the murders and challenged the credibility of Ross and Ridley. At sentencing, the jury found the multiple-homicides aggravator and imposed death sentences for the murders.
Procedural history
Hampton was convicted in Arizona of two first-degree murders and manslaughter for the death of Ramsdell's unborn child and was sentenced to death for the murders. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed on direct appeal and summarily denied state post-conviction review after the Maricopa County Superior Court denied his ineffective-assistance claims following an evidentiary hearing. The District of Arizona denied Hampton's federal habeas petition, denied evidentiary development, declined to issue a certificate of appealability, and denied a Rule 59(e) motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of the certified claims and declined to expand the certificate of appealability.