Summary
The Ninth Circuit held that a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether Princess Cruise Lines and Alaska Hotel Properties knew or should have known that a hotel bathroom configuration was unreasonably dangerous under maritime negligence principles. The court vacated summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim and remanded for further proceedings. It affirmed summary judgment on the alternative negligence per se theory because the movable shower curtain was not an obstruction under the cited plumbing codes.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether summary judgment was proper on Petrey's maritime negligence claim where Princess undisputedly created the bathroom configuration but Petrey presented evidence creating a factual dispute about whether Princess knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous.
- Whether a plaintiff must present evidence of prior similar incidents to establish actual or constructive knowledge that a condition was unreasonably dangerous.
- Whether an easily movable shower curtain qualifies as an "obstruction" under the applicable plumbing codes for purposes of a negligence per se claim.
Holdings
- Under maritime law, a negligence plaintiff must establish duty, breach, causation, and damages, and a carrier or shipowner owes passengers a duty of reasonable care under the circumstances.
- Where the alleged risk-creating condition is not unique to the maritime context, the plaintiff must show that the defendant knew or should have known both that the condition existed and that a reasonable person would have foreseen that the condition was unreasonably dangerous.
- Evidence that the defendant created the condition establishes knowledge that the condition existed but does not, by itself, establish that the defendant knew or should have known the condition was unreasonably dangerous. Evidence of prior similar incidents is relevant but is not required; other competent evidence, including expert opinion, may create a genuine factual dispute.
- An easily movable shower curtain is not an "obstruction" for purposes of the plumbing-code requirement that a toilet be at least fifteen inches from a side wall or obstruction; therefore, the shower-curtain placement did not violate the cited plumbing codes and could not support Petrey's negligence per se theory.
Key quotations
“To show the defendant created or maintained an unreasonable risk of foreseeable harm, the plaintiff must show the defendant knew or should have known both that the condition existed and that a reasonable person would have foreseen that the condition was unreasonably dangerous.” (7-8)
“Thus, while we agree that evidence showing a defendant created a condition proves the defendant knew the condition existed, such evidence does not necessarily prove the defendant knew or should have known the condition was unreasonably dangerous.” (11)
“proof of similar incidents is relevant to show actual or constructive knowledge of unreasonable dangerousness, but not required.” (11-12)
“We conclude that the easily movable shower curtain does not qualify as an “obstruction” for the purpose of the plumbing code requirement.” (17)
Factual background
Petrey purchased a sea/land cruise package that included a stay at the Denali Princess Wilderness Lodge, owned and operated by Princess entities. While using the hotel-room bathroom, Petrey's shoulder rubbed against the shower curtain; when he stood and turned to pull up his shorts, he tripped backward over a raised shower ledge and suffered a head and neck injury. He alleged that the configuration of the toilet, shower curtain, and ledge created an unreasonably dangerous condition. Expert evidence and lodge personnel testimony supported his contention that the configuration was hazardous and that Princess had or should have had knowledge of its dangerousness.
Procedural history
Petrey sued Princess in diversity jurisdiction after tripping over a shower ledge at the Denali Princess Wilderness Lodge. The district court granted Princess summary judgment, holding that Petrey lacked evidence of actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition and could not establish negligence per se based on an applicable building-code violation. The Ninth Circuit vacated summary judgment on the traditional maritime negligence claim, affirmed summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, and remanded.
Remand instructions
Vacate the grant of summary judgment on Petrey's traditional maritime negligence claim, affirm the grant of summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, and remand for further proceedings on the maritime negligence claim. Each party bears its own costs on appeal.