N. C. Freed Company, Inc., and International Roofing Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Federal Trade Commission

473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 1973) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · February 1, 1973 · No. No. 49, Docket 72-1381

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Federal Reserve Board did not exceed its authority by interpreting the Truth-in-Lending Act's rescission provision to cover statutory liens arising from home-improvement transactions. The court concluded that the challenged regulation, 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a), was consistent with the Act's remedial purpose and validly included liens acquired or arising by operation of law. The court reversed the district court's judgment invalidating the regulation.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Moore, Circuit Judge; Hays, Circuit Judge; Mulligan, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
February 1, 1973
Docket number
No. 49, Docket 72-1381
Procedural posture
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Federal Trade Commission appealed from the Western District of New York's judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment declaring invalid a Federal Reserve Board Truth-in-Lending regulation and enjoining its enforcement.
Standard of review
De novo review of the district court's judgment on cross-motions for summary judgment and review of the validity of the agency regulation.
Precedential value
Published federal appellate opinion; precedential within the Second Circuit subject to later authority.
Parties
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Trade Commission v. N. C. Freed Company, Inc., International Roofing Corp.
Disposition
reversed

Topics

truth in lendingconsumer protectionjudicial review of agency actionadministrative procedure actstatutory interpretation

Practice areas

consumer creditadministrative lawhome improvement and construction law

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the Federal Reserve Board exceeded its authority under Truth-in-Lending Act § 125(a), 15 U.S.C. § 1635(a), by promulgating 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) to cover statutory or nonconsensual liens that would arise by operation of law.
  2. Whether the Board's regulation was a permissible and reasonable implementation of the Truth-in-Lending Act's disclosure and rescission provisions.

Holdings

  1. The right of rescission under § 125(a) extends to statutory liens, including mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and similar liens arising by operation of law in connection with a home-improvement credit transaction.
  2. The Federal Reserve Board did not exceed its authority by defining security interest to include statutory liens and by extending the § 125(a) rescission right to transactions involving those liens.

Key quotations

We hold that the Federal Reserve Board did not exceed its authority in defining "security interest" to include statutory liens, and in interpreting the right of rescission provided in Section 125 (a) as extending to such statutory liens. (¶ 17)
The challenged regulation constitutes a clarification, and not an improper extension, of the statute and it therefore does not exceed the bounds of the mandate given the Board by Congress. (¶ 17)

Factual background

The appellees were home-improvement contractors whose customers generally entered into credit contracts, signed unsecured promissory notes, and had the notes assigned to banks or other financial institutions. Although customers ordinarily did not execute second mortgages or other consensual security instruments, state law could generate mechanic's, materialmen's, artisan's, and similar statutory liens against the customer's residence when the work began or materials were supplied. The Federal Reserve Board promulgated 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a), granting a three-day rescission right when a security interest was or would be retained or acquired in the consumer's residence.

Procedural history

The appellee home-improvement companies brought an action for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act and Administrative Procedure Act. The district court held that 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(a) exceeded the Board's statutory authority insofar as it covered statutory liens that would arise in the future and entered judgment for the appellees. The Second Circuit reversed.

Court Document

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