Browning v. Winnfield Veneer Co.

554 So. 2d 210 (2d Cir. 1989) · Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit · December 6, 1989 · No. No. 20970-CA

Summary

The Louisiana Second Circuit considers whether filing a premature workers' compensation suit in district court interrupts the one-year prescriptive period under Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1209. The court adopts the reasoning that timely filing of the suit interrupted prescription, reverses summary judgments dismissing the claims as prescribed, and remands for further proceedings.

Court
Court of Appeal of Louisiana, Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
HALL, Chief Judge; HALL, C.J.; JONES, J.; LINDSAY, J.
Jurisdiction
Louisiana
Decision date
December 6, 1989
Docket number
No. 20970-CA
Procedural posture
Plaintiff appealed devolutively from summary judgments in favor of Winnfield Veneer Company and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, which dismissed his workers' compensation suit with prejudice as prescribed.
Standard of review
Summary judgment is reviewed to determine whether there is no genuine issue of material fact and whether the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Precedential value
Published Louisiana Court of Appeal opinion; precedential within the applicable jurisdiction subject to later treatment.
Parties
Paul E. Browning v. Winnfield Veneer Company, Aetna Casualty and Surety Company
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded

Topics

workers compensationstatute of limitationssummary judgmentstatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Practice areas

workers compensationcivil procedurestatutory interpretationappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether filing a workers' compensation suit in district court within one year of the accident interrupts the prescriptive period under LSA-R.S. 23:1209 even though the suit is subject to an exception of prematurity for failure to first pursue administrative resolution.
  2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment dismissing the workers' compensation claims as prescribed.

Holdings

  1. Filing a workers' compensation suit against an alleged statutory employer in a court of competent jurisdiction within the one-year period interrupts prescription, even though the plaintiff did not first file a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation and the suit is therefore subject to an exception of prematurity.
  2. The summary judgments dismissing Browning's workers' compensation suit as prescribed were erroneous and must be reversed and set aside.

Key quotations

Failure to file a claim for informal, extrajudicial resolution of plaintiff's claim renders a suit for benefits premature, but it does not extinguish the action or the employer's obligation. (214)
Thus, we hold that filing suit against Winnfield Veneer Company within the one-year prescriptive period interrupted prescription as to plaintiff's action against Winnfield, alleged to be plaintiff's statutory employer, and against Aetna, alleged to be solidarily liable with Winnfield as the compensation insurer of plaintiff's actual employer, Browning Wood Haulers, assuming that plaintiff's allegations are factually correct. (214)

Factual background

Paul E. Browning alleged that he was injured in a work-related accident while employed by Browning Wood Haulers, which was performing work for Winnfield Veneer Company. He alleged that Winnfield was his statutory employer and that Aetna insured Browning Wood Haulers and was solidarily liable. Browning filed suit within one year of the accident, but he did not file a formal claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Administration until August 1987, after the one-year period had expired.

Procedural history

Browning filed suit in district court on April 13, 1987, alleging a work-related accident occurring on April 14, 1986. The defendants raised prematurity and prescription defenses. Browning later filed a claim with the Office of Workers' Compensation Administration, but the claim was denied as prescribed because it was filed more than one year after the accident. The district court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment on February 14, 1989, and Browning appealed.

Remand instructions

The summary judgments are reversed and set aside, the motions for summary judgment are denied, and the action is remanded to the district court for further proceedings.

Court Document

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