D. Lawrence Burdick v. American Express Company

57 U.S.L.W. 2446 (2d Cir. 1989) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · January 13, 1989 · No. No. 1227, Docket 88-7216

Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed dismissal of D. Lawrence Burdick’s civil RICO complaint against American Express for failure to state a claim. The court held that Burdick lacked standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) because the alleged predicate acts injured Shearson’s customers, not Burdick, and his discharge and loss of his client base were too remotely related to the alleged fraud.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Per curiam; Van Graafeiland; Miner; Mahoney
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
January 13, 1989
Docket number
No. 1227, Docket 88-7216
Procedural posture
Plaintiff appealed the Southern District of New York's dismissal of his civil RICO complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, based on lack of standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
Standard of review
On review of a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the court assumed the complaint's allegations to be true.
Precedential value
Published Second Circuit opinion; precedential
Parties
D. Lawrence Burdick v. American Express Company
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

commercial litigationcivil procedurepleadingsmotions to dismissemployment law

Practice areas

RICOcommercial litigationcivil procedureemployment lawsecurities fraud

Questions Presented

  1. Whether a civil RICO plaintiff has standing under 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) without alleging that the predicate acts directly injured the plaintiff's own business or property.
  2. Whether Burdick's alleged interference with his ability to service customers, earn a living, and retain his client base was sufficiently related to Shearson's alleged mail and securities fraud to constitute an injury by reason of a RICO violation.
  3. Whether Burdick's discharge after complaining about the alleged fraudulent practices constituted a compensable injury under civil RICO.

Holdings

  1. A civil RICO plaintiff must allege that injury to the plaintiff's own business or property resulted from the predicate acts constituting the alleged RICO violation; injury suffered by customers or other persons is insufficient.
  2. Alleged harm consisting of interference with Burdick's ability to service customers, keep them satisfied, and earn a living was too remotely related to the alleged mail and securities fraud to support civil RICO standing.
  3. An employee's discharge after reporting an employer's alleged illegal scheme does not, without more, constitute injury to business or property by reason of the predicate acts for purposes of civil RICO standing.

Key quotations

plaintiff only has standing [under Sec. 1964(c) ] if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation. (Paragraph 9)
Firing Nodine under these circumstances was wrong, but it did not violate the RICO Act. (Paragraph 12)

Factual background

Burdick was a former vice president of Shearson Lehman Brothers, a wholly owned subsidiary of American Express. He alleged that Shearson delayed crediting customers' dividend and interest payments while using the funds for its own purposes, and that Shearson's representatives churned customer accounts and charged excessive commissions. Burdick claimed that he complained about those practices, refused to participate, and was fired, allegedly causing him to lose his client base and income.

Procedural history

Burdick sued American Express seeking treble damages under civil RICO, alleging that practices by its subsidiary, Shearson, constituted mail and securities fraud and that he was discharged after complaining about those practices. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rules 12(b)(6) and 9(b), concluding that Burdick was not injured by reason of the alleged predicate acts within the meaning of § 1964(c). The Second Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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