Summary
The Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Unisource Worldwide, Inc. and Georgia Pacific Corp. on David D. Henwood’s claims under the ADEA, Connecticut employment and wage statutes, and various common-law theories. The court held that, even assuming Henwood established a prima facie age-discrimination case, he failed to present sufficient evidence that the employers’ legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations were motivated by age discrimination.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether summary judgment was proper on Henwood's state statutory and common-law claims.
- Whether Henwood produced sufficient evidence to establish that age discrimination was a motivating factor in Unisource's challenged employment actions after assuming that he established a prima facie case under the ADEA.
Holdings
- The state and common-law claims were properly dismissed on summary judgment.
- Assuming Henwood established a prima facie case of age discrimination, he failed to present sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that age was one of Unisource's motivating factors; summary judgment was therefore proper on the federal age-discrimination claim.
- Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; speculation and conjecture are insufficient to avoid judgment.
Key quotations
““Summary judgment is appropriate where there exists no genuine issue of material fact and, based on the undisputed facts, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”” (26)
““were not the only reasons and that the prohibited factor was at least one of the ‘motivating’ factors.”” (28)
““even if we view the evidence as creating an issue of fact on pretext, appellant must point to evidence from which a fact-finder could infer that the pretext was masking unlawful discrimination.”” (28)
Factual background
Henwood alleged that Unisource took several adverse employment actions involving the Watchtower account, commissions associated with Watchtower and Websource, payments received from Fraser Papers, and a proposed salaried transition period. Unisource offered nondiscriminatory explanations for each action, including Watchtower's refusal to work with Henwood, the distinct nature of the Websource account, the characterization of Fraser's payments as disengagement fees, and the proposed six-month transition period. Although Henwood disputed whether Jim O'Toole prevented him from developing new accounts, the court concluded that this dispute did not provide sufficient evidence that age discrimination was a motivating factor.
Procedural history
The district court entered judgment for defendants on October 5, 2006, after granting summary judgment. On appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the summary-judgment ruling de novo and affirmed for substantially the reasons stated by the district court, holding that the state and common-law claims were properly dismissed and that plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence of age-discriminatory motivation.