United States v. Medunjanin

752 F.3d 576 (2d Cir. 2014) · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · May 20, 2014 · No. 12-4724

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed Adis Medunjanin's convictions and sentence for terrorism-related offenses. The court held that his postarrest statements were not subject to suppression because he had not invoked his right to counsel before custodial interrogation and knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. The court also rejected his Sixth Amendment and substantive due process claims.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Kearse, Circuit Judge; Wesley, Circuit Judge; Droney, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
May 20, 2014
Docket number
12-4724
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. He challenged the denial of his pretrial motion to suppress postarrest inculpatory statements based on alleged violations of Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, and the Sixth Amendment.
Standard of review
The court reviewed legal conclusions on a motion to suppress de novo and factual findings for clear error, deferring to the district court's credibility assessments and permissible choices between competing views of the evidence.
Precedential value
published precedential federal appellate opinion
Parties
Adis Medunjanin, aka Muhammad v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

miranda rightsright to counselcriminal procedureappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

criminal procedureconstitutional lawappellate procedureterrorism offenses

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Medunjanin invoked his Miranda right to counsel before arrest by asking whether his attorney had been notified or by counsel's communications to law enforcement.
  2. Whether Medunjanin's postarrest Miranda waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the totality of the circumstances.
  3. Whether the government's preindictment questioning and failure to inform Medunjanin that his attorney was trying to reach him violated the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
  4. Whether the government's refusal to deal with Medunjanin solely through counsel violated substantive due process under the Fifth Amendment.
  5. Whether the district court abused its discretion by denying Medunjanin's request to call an Assistant United States Attorney as a suppression-hearing witness.

Holdings

  1. Even assuming Miranda rights may be asserted before a suspect is in custody and before questioning, Medunjanin did not clearly and unambiguously invoke his right to counsel before his arrest. Counsel's requests that Medunjanin not be questioned were insufficient because the Miranda right is personal to the suspect, and Medunjanin's question about whether his attorney had been notified was at most ambiguous.
  2. Medunjanin knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights, and the district court did not clearly err in finding that his will was not overborne by the agents' comments about his family or the expense of his attorney.
  3. The government's preindictment conduct did not violate or ripen into a violation of Medunjanin's Sixth Amendment right to counsel because that right attaches only upon initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, and after indictment the agents immediately ceased questioning when Medunjanin indicated that he wanted to speak with counsel.
  4. The government's failure to disclose Medunjanin's whereabouts to his attorney, failure to inform him that counsel was attempting to reach him, and refusal to deal with him solely through counsel did not violate substantive due process.

Key quotations

Thus, even assuming that Miranda rights may properly be asserted by a suspect prior to his being in custody and prior to his being questioned, there was no clear and unambiguous invocation of the right to counsel by Medunjanin before his arrest. (752 F.3d at 584)
In determining whether or not the relinquishment of the right was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, the court must consider "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." (752 F.3d at 585)
A suspect has no constitutional right to have "the police inform [him] of an attorney's efforts to reach him." (752 F.3d at 589)
Our conclusions above that Medunjanin's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments were not violated foreclose his argument that any impedance of his relationship with his attorney deprived him of substantive due process. (752 F.3d at 590)

Factual background

Medunjanin traveled from New York to Pakistan with Najibullah Zazi and Zarein Ahmedzay, received al-Qaeda-related religious and weapons training, and returned to the United States as part of a plan involving coordinated subway bombings. After law enforcement searched his home and seized his passports, he deliberately caused a high-speed collision while attempting to trigger an explosion and kill himself and others. Following his arrest and hospital evaluation, agents questioned him after administering Miranda warnings; he signed three written waivers and made incriminating statements before invoking his desire to speak with counsel after learning of the indictment's murder-conspiracy charge.

Procedural history

The district court denied Medunjanin's motion to suppress statements made during postarrest questioning, concluding that he had not clearly invoked his Miranda right to counsel before arrest and that his subsequent written waivers were knowing and voluntary. The case proceeded to trial, where the statements were admitted and Medunjanin was convicted on all nine counts and sentenced principally to life plus 95 years' imprisonment. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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