United States v. Taj Williams

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · November 22, 2019 · No. 18-1267-cr

Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed arson and unregistered Molotov cocktail convictions, holding that the district court’s jury instruction on attempt did not constitute plain error because the evidence overwhelmingly supported completed arson. The court rejected the defendant’s impossibility defense (state law banning Molotov cocktails did not preclude federal registration) under *United States v. Shepardson*, and found no Fifth Amendment violation in the admission of custodial statements. At sentencing, any potential error in including a prior conviction for falsely reporting an incident under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1) was harmless because the criminal history category would not change. Concurring opinions addressed the standard for reviewing whether a prior offense is “similar to” excluded offenses and the continued application of “due deference” after *Booker*.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Pooler; Calabresi; Park
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
November 22, 2019
Docket number
18-1267-cr
Procedural posture
Appeal from judgment of conviction after jury trial
Standard of review
Plain error for unpreserved jury instruction error; clear error for factual findings; de novo for legal conclusions; abuse of discretion for suppression motion; harmless error for sentencing error.
Precedential value
Published
Parties
Taj Williams v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

criminal proceduresentencingfifth amendmentevidencestandard of reviewharmless errorappellate procedure

Practice areas

Criminal LawArsonFirearmsSentencingAppellate Procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court committed plain error in its jury instructions on arson and attempted arson by suggesting that the jury could convict Williams of attempted arson with a reckless mental state.
  2. Whether Williams was convicted of a legally impossible crime because New York's ban on Molotov cocktails made it impossible to comply with federal registration requirements, violating due process.
  3. Whether the district court erred in denying Williams's motion to suppress his custodial statements as involuntary under the Fifth Amendment due to police trickery, lack of sleep, and length of interrogation.
  4. Whether the district court erred in overstating Williams's criminal history by including a conviction for falsely reporting an incident under New York Penal Law § 240.50, which is similar to an excluded offense under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1).

Holdings

  1. The district court did not commit plain error. The instruction on attempt required the jury to find that the defendant intended to commit the crime charged, which is consistent with the mental state for intentional arson. Even if there was error, Williams was not prejudiced because the evidence overwhelmingly supported a completed arson, so the jury would have necessarily found him guilty of the properly instructed theory.
  2. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Shepardson, 167 F.3d 120, 123-24 (2d Cir. 1999), which held that registration is not impossible in the absence of a federal statutory ban. The testimony at trial confirmed that Molotov cocktails had been registered before.
  3. The district court did not abuse its discretion. The court reviewed the video of the interrogation and heard testimony, and its determination that the interrogation did not rise to a constitutional violation is supported by the record. The officers' trickery, combined with Williams's lack of sleep and the length of interrogation, did not render the statements involuntary.
  4. Even if the district court erred in including the conviction, any error was harmless because excluding it would not change Williams's criminal history category or guidelines range.

Key quotations

In order to satisfy this standard, an appellant must demonstrate that (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. (4)
Significantly, when instructing the jury on attempt, the district court stated that the government must prove that the 'defendant intended to commit the crime charged.' (5)
Here, the evidence at trial overwhelmingly supported a completed arson. (5)
His argument is foreclosed by United States v. Shepardson, 167 F.3d 120, 123‐24 (2d Cir. 1999), where we found that in the absence of a federal statutory ban on the unregistered weapon, registration is not impossible. (6)
We need not decide whether this was error because even if that conviction were excluded, Williams’s criminal history category—and therefore his recommended Guidelines range—would not change. (7)

Factual background

On January 18, 2015, an individual set fire to the Chili Express convenience store in Rochester, New York. Surveillance footage showed a white Chevy Trailblazer with a distinctive black hood and missing fuel cap drive by the store twice. Later footage captured a person with a dark gray sweatshirt use a tire iron to smash the front door glass, then take out two Molotov cocktails from a cellophane bag, light them, and throw them inside. The person also threw a third unlit device into the blaze before running away. The person was seen running back to the Trailblazer. Law enforcement eventually stopped the vehicle, driven by Williams, and arrested him. A search of the car yielded a tire iron, gray sweatshirt, green BIC lighter, red gas can, and a ripped blue two-tone U-Haul blanket. Williams was charged with arson and possession of unregistered Molotov cocktails.

Procedural history

Williams was convicted after a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York (Wolford, J.) on charges of arson (18 U.S.C. § 844(i)) and possession of unregistered Molotov cocktails (26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5845(a)(8), 5845(f), 5861(d), 5871). He was sentenced to 104 months' imprisonment and 3 years' supervised release. He appealed.

Court Document

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