Coleman v. Grand

No. 21-800 · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · November 3, 2025 · No. 21-800

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Maria Kim Grand in Steven Douglas Coleman's New York defamation action. The court held that the challenged statements in Grand's letter characterizing her relationship with Coleman and describing his conduct as sexual harassment were non-actionable opinions based on disclosed facts. Judge Menashi dissented.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Richard J. Sullivan, Circuit Judge; Chin, Circuit Judge; Sullivan, Circuit Judge; Menashi, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decision date
November 3, 2025
Docket number
21-800
Procedural posture
Coleman appealed from the Eastern District of New York's grant of summary judgment to Grand on Coleman's New York defamation claim.
Standard of review
The court reviewed the district court's legal conclusions and grant of summary judgment de novo, construing all facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Whether particular words are defamatory is a legal question for the court in the first instance.
Precedential value
Published and precedential
Parties
Steven Douglas Coleman v. Maria Kim Grand
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

tortsappellate procedurestandard of review

Practice areas

defamationtortsappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the challenged statements in Grand's letter were actionable factual assertions or protected statements of opinion under New York defamation law.
  2. Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Coleman's defamation claim.
  3. Whether the court needed to reach the parties' dispute concerning actual malice.

Holdings

  1. The challenged statements—including that Coleman convinced Grand to be intimate, that Grand was sexually harassed within a professional relationship, that the harassment began when she no longer wanted intimacy, that Coleman never took no for an answer, and that she felt forced to share a hotel room—were non-actionable opinions rather than defamatory factual assertions because Grand disclosed the underlying facts and presented her characterizations as her personal assessment of those facts.

Key quotations

Thus, reasonable readers could only have understood Grand’s assessment that Coleman sexually harassed her (and similar statements of opinion) as Grand’s personal characterization of the facts set forth in the letter, rather than as a distinct assertion of fact. (12-13)
Because Coleman challenges only Grand’s expressions of non-actionable opinion – and not the facts supporting those opinions – we cannot agree with the dissent that the district court erred in concluding that Coleman’s defamation claim fails as a matter of law. (29-30)

Factual background

Grand, a saxophonist and former pupil of Coleman, emailed a seven-page letter to approximately forty friends and colleagues in November 2017 describing an intermittent sexual relationship with Coleman from 2011 to 2016. The letter recounted conduct that Grand characterized as sexual harassment, including alleged pressure to have sex in exchange for mentorship and professional opportunities, while also acknowledging her own participation in and ambivalence about the relationship. Coleman claimed that several statements and implications in the letter were false and defamatory.

Procedural history

Coleman sued Grand in October 2018, alleging that a letter she circulated to approximately forty friends and colleagues defamed him by accusing him of sexual harassment. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to Grand, concluding that Coleman had not shown a triable issue concerning actual malice and, alternatively, that the challenged statements were protected opinions rather than actionable factual assertions. Coleman appealed. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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