Granite State Insurance Co. v. Primary Arms, LLC

Granite State · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · December 10, 2025 · No. 24-2748-cv

Summary

The Second Circuit affirmed a Southern District of New York judgment holding that Granite State Insurance Company and National Union Fire Insurance Company had no duty to defend or indemnify Primary Arms, LLC under Texas law. The court applied Texas's eight-corners rule and concluded that underlying lawsuits concerning the intentional marketing and sale of ghost-gun parts did not allege harm caused by an accidental occurrence under the insurance policies. The court rejected Primary Arms' reliance on negligence-based claims and labels, emphasizing that the alleged financial harms were natural and expected results of its intentional conduct.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Chin, Circuit Judge; Nardini, Circuit Judge; Kahn, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decision date
December 10, 2025
Docket number
24-2748-cv
Procedural posture
The insurers brought a declaratory-judgment action seeking a determination that their liability policies imposed no duty to defend or indemnify Primary Arms in three underlying lawsuits. The district court granted the insurers' partial summary-judgment motion on the duty to defend, denied Primary Arms' cross-motion, subsequently ruled that the same reasoning disposed of the duty to indemnify, entered final judgment for the insurers, and dismissed Primary Arms' counterclaim. Primary Arms appealed.
Standard of review
De novo review of the district court's grant of summary judgment, including cross-motions for summary judgment. The court viewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drew reasonable inferences in that party's favor; for cross-motions, each motion was evaluated on its own merits.
Precedential value
Published and precedential
Parties
Primary Arms, LLC v. Granite State Insurance Company, National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh, Pa.
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

duty to defendduty to indemnifyinsurance coveragedeclaratory relief insurancestandard of review

Practice areas

insurance coverageinsurance litigationappellate procedurecommercial litigation

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the underlying lawsuits alleged harm caused by an accident, and therefore an occurrence, within the meaning of the insurance policies under Texas law.
  2. Whether conclusory references to negligence, negligence per se, or negligent entrustment transformed the underlying allegations of intentional marketing and sales into allegations of an accident.
  3. Whether products-completed-operations coverage required a different, subjective accident analysis under Texas law.
  4. Whether the insurers had a duty to indemnify Primary Arms where the parties agreed that the district court's duty-to-defend ruling was dispositive.

Holdings

  1. The underlying lawsuits did not allege harm arising from an accident and therefore did not allege an occurrence required to trigger coverage. Primary Arms intentionally marketed, sold, and shipped firearm parts to persons likely to use them for unlawful purposes, and the resulting financial harm from increased gun violence was a natural and expected result of those acts.
  2. They did not. The court disregarded conclusory legal labels and examined the factual allegations, which described intentional conduct and expected consequences rather than negligent performance of an intentional act producing an unexpected result.
  3. Texas law does not provide a different accident analysis for products-completed-operations coverage. The ordinary Blue Bell accident standard applies to claims involving products.
  4. The insurers had no duty to indemnify Primary Arms. The parties agreed below that the district court's duty-to-defend ruling disposed of the indemnity claims, and Primary Arms did not argue otherwise on appeal.

Key quotations

"Under [Texas'] eight-corners rule," we determine an "insurer's duty to defend . . . by comparing the allegations in the plaintiff's petition to the policy provisions, without regard to the truth or falsity of those allegations and without reference to facts otherwise known or ultimately proven." (11-12)
"Consistent with ordinary usage, the Supreme Court of Texas has defined the term 'accident' as a 'fortuitous, unexpected, and unintended event.'" (14)
Because Primary Arms "[1] commit[ted] . . . intentional act[s] that [2] result[ed] in injuries that ordinarily follow from or could be reasonably anticipated from the intentional act[s]," the asserted injuries do not arise from an "accident." (19)

Factual background

Primary Arms, a Texas-based firearms retailer, sold and shipped firearms and unfinished firearm frames and receivers, including to New York residents. The underlying complaints alleged that Primary Arms intentionally marketed and sold easily convertible, unserialized firearm parts to people who could not legally purchase firearms or who posed risks of harm, contributing to increased gun violence. New York State, Buffalo, and Rochester alleged that the resulting gun violence caused them financial harm through increased law-enforcement, hospital, and community-service expenditures. The insurers' policies covered damages caused by an occurrence, defined as an accident.

Procedural history

After New York State, Buffalo, and Rochester sued Primary Arms and other firearms companies over alleged marketing and sales of ghost-gun kits and parts, Primary Arms demanded a defense and indemnity from Granite State. The insurers filed this action on August 29, 2023. The Southern District of New York granted the insurers summary judgment on August 30, 2024, entered an order concerning indemnity on September 16, 2024, and entered final judgment for the insurers. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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