United States v. Perez

Perez · United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit · August 19, 2025 · No. 24-162-cr

Summary

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of Steven Perez for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), which prohibits the interstate transport of firearms without a federal license. Applying the Bruen text-and-history framework, the court held that the statute is a presumptively lawful commercial regulation that does not meaningfully constrain the Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. Even under step two of the Bruen test, the court found the regulation consistent with the nation's historical tradition of controlling the movement of firearms across borders.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Nathan, Circuit Judge; Robinson, Circuit Judge; Pérez, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
Decision date
August 19, 2025
Docket number
24-162-cr
Procedural posture
Perez appealed his convictions in the Southern District of New York, arguing that 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) violates the Second Amendment.
Standard of review
Constitutional challenges to federal statutes are reviewed de novo.
Precedential value
Published and precedential Second Circuit opinion
Parties
Steven Perez, a/k/a Lucha, a/k/a Lucha El v. United States of America
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

second amendmentconstitutional lawcriminal procedure

Practice areas

constitutional lawcriminal lawfirearms lawappellate procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3), as applied to Perez, violates the Second Amendment.
  2. Whether the district court's judgment should be reversed because Perez's convictions under § 922(a)(3) and the related conspiracy statute were unconstitutional.

Holdings

  1. Section 922(a)(3) is a presumptively lawful regulation imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of firearms and does not meaningfully constrain the ability to keep and bear arms.
  2. Section 922(a)(3) is consistent with the nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation and therefore satisfies the second step of the Second Amendment analysis.
  3. Decastro remains good law because its conclusion that § 922(a)(3) minimally burdens firearm acquisition was not dependent on the means-end scrutiny rejected in Bruen.

Key quotations

We reaffirm that conclusion and hold that § 922(a)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Lucha El. (3)
Accordingly, we reaffirm Decastro and hold that § 922(a)(3) is a lawful commercial sale regulation that does not materially constrain Lucha El’s Second Amendment right to “keep” and “bear” arms. (16)
In sum, § 922(a)(3) is a presumptively lawful commercial sale regulation that does not eliminate, or even materially burden, the ability of law-abiding, responsible citizens to keep and bear firearms. (26)

Factual background

Perez was a New York resident who obtained firearms purchased in South Carolina by Keith Vereen, whom the evidence showed acted as a straw purchaser. Law enforcement recovered one firearm from Perez after an arrest in the Bronx and multiple firearms, magazines, and ammunition from vehicles stopped in Massachusetts. Perez lacked the requisite state permits to purchase firearms legally in New York and used Vereen to obtain and transport the firearms into New York.

Procedural history

Perez was indicted for interstate transport of firearms under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(3) and later charged by superseding indictment with conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371. The district court denied his motion to dismiss the § 922(a)(3) charge, a jury convicted him on both counts, and the court sentenced him to sixteen months' imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of the firearms. The Second Circuit affirmed.

Court Document

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