State of Louisiana v. Cross Sebastian McCray

No. 56,866-KA · Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit · May 20, 2026 · No. 56,866-KA

Summary

The Louisiana Second Circuit affirmed Cross Sebastian McCray’s conviction for simple arson and his 10-year hard-labor sentence. The court held that La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2) encompasses both intentional and unintentional fire-starting when the offender starts a fire while perpetrating or attempting another felony. The court also concluded that the sentence was not constitutionally excessive.

Court
Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit
Writing for the Court
Stone; Marcotte; Ellender
Jurisdiction
Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit
Decision date
May 20, 2026
Docket number
56,866-KA
Procedural posture
Defendant appealed his jury conviction for simple arson and his ten-year hard-labor sentence, arguing that the evidence was legally insufficient under the charged statutory subsection and that the sentence was excessive.
Standard of review
The interpretation of La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2) is reviewed as a question of law. A sentence within statutory limits is reviewed for abuse of discretion; an excessive-sentence claim is also evaluated under the constitutional gross-disproportionality standard.
Precedential value
published and precedential
Parties
Cross Sebastian McCray v. State of Louisiana
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

statutory interpretationcriminal proceduresentencingappellate procedurecruel and unusual punishment

Practice areas

criminal lawcriminal proceduresentencingstatutory interpretationappellate practice

Questions Presented

  1. Whether La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2), which criminalizes starting a fire while perpetrating or attempting another felony even though the offender does not intend to start a fire, applies when the defendant intentionally starts the fire.
  2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support McCray's conviction for simple arson under La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2), including whether the burglary remained ongoing when he started the fire.
  3. Whether McCray's ten-year sentence for simple arson with damage of $500 or more was constitutionally excessive under La. Const. art. I, § 20.

Holdings

  1. La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2) encompasses both intentional and unintentional fire-starting. The phrase "even though the offender does not have the intent to start a fire" makes intent unnecessary and does not create a defense when the offender did intend to start the fire.
  2. The evidence was sufficient to support McCray's conviction because he entered the building without authorization and with intent to commit a felony or theft, and started the fire while still inside and engaged in the ongoing perpetration of simple burglary.
  3. The ten-year sentence was not constitutionally excessive and did not constitute an abuse of the trial court's sentencing discretion.

Key quotations

We hold that this form of the crime includes both intentional and unintentional fire-starting. (7)
The crime is completed when the offender starts a fire while engaged in the perpetration of another felony whether he intended to start a fire or not. (7)
The defendant’s sentence is not excessive. (10)

Factual background

McCray entered an automobile repair shop at night, removed a vehicle and tools, and reentered the building shortly thereafter. He unscrewed a lightbulb, distributed fuel around the shop, and started a fire that damaged the building and vehicles by more than $500. Surveillance footage, witness testimony, and a fingerprint on the lightbulb connected McCray to the burglary and fire.

Procedural history

McCray was charged by bill of information and later by an amended bill with simple arson under La. R.S. 14:52(A)(2). Following a jury trial on May 7 and 8, 2025, he was convicted as charged and sentenced on June 17, 2025, to ten years at hard labor. The trial court denied his motion to reconsider sentence, and the Louisiana Court of Appeal, Second Circuit, affirmed the conviction and sentence.

Court Document

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