Summary
The Second Circuit affirmed Rafael Antonio Fabian’s conviction for conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and the district court’s jury instructions. The court also upheld the reasonableness of Fabian’s 15-year sentence. It vacated the standard conditions of supervised release because the district court had not made Fabian aware of those conditions at sentencing and remanded for further proceedings.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Fabian guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine.
- Whether the district court plainly erred by failing to instruct the jury on the buyer-seller exception to conspiracy liability.
- Whether the district court abused its discretion in responding to the jury’s request for exhibits and evidence linking Fabian to the contact identified as Alofoke Music.
- Whether Fabian’s 15-year sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
- Whether the district court improperly included standard, nonmandatory supervised-release conditions in the written judgment without pronouncing or otherwise making Fabian aware of them at sentencing.
Holdings
- The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Fabian conspired with Suriel to distribute crack cocaine.
- The district court did not err, plainly or otherwise, by declining to instruct the jury on the buyer-seller exception because the evidence provided no factual basis for such an instruction.
- The district court did not abuse its discretion or commit prejudicial error by providing the requested exhibits and related contextual evidence while reminding the jury that it alone determined the facts.
- Fabian’s 15-year sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable.
- The standard, nonmandatory supervised-release conditions included in the written judgment without being pronounced or otherwise made known to Fabian at sentencing had to be vacated, and the matter had to be remanded for reconsideration of those conditions.
Key quotations
“The operative question is thus whether a rational jury could have found Fabian guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of conspiring to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846.” (14)
“The evidence is therefore overwhelming that Fabian and Suriel “shared a conspiratorial purpose to advance other transfers” by Suriel.” (19)
“Though the court need not “read the full text of every condition on the record[,] . . . it must, at the very least, . . . expressly adopt or specifically incorporate by reference particular conditions that have been set forth in writing and made available to the defendant in the PSR, the Guidelines, or a notice adopted by the court.”” (40)
Factual background
Fabian supplied Rafael Suriel with increasing quantities of powder cocaine and heroin on consignment for distribution in Brooklyn. Fabian knew Suriel was converting powder cocaine into crack cocaine, advised him how to maximize the yield, vetted customers, and directed aspects of Suriel’s resale business. DEA investigations led to seizures of crack cocaine linked to Fabian’s supplied cocaine, arrests of participants, and recovery of drug ledgers and communications connecting Fabian to the operation.
Procedural history
Fabian was indicted in the Eastern District of New York and tried in August 2019. The jury convicted him of the charged drug conspiracy involving at least 280 grams of crack cocaine, but found the charged quantities of heroin and powder cocaine unproven. The district court denied Fabian’s post-trial Rule 29 motion, later sentenced him to 15 years’ imprisonment and five years of supervised release, and included standard supervised-release conditions in the written judgment without pronouncing them at sentencing. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, vacated the standard supervised-release conditions, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Remand instructions
The district court must address the standard conditions of supervised release. If it intends to reimpose them, it must recite them to Fabian or direct him to a written copy that was made available to him, expressly adopt the conditions, and give him an opportunity to object. If it declines to reimpose them, it may strike them from the judgment.