Summary
Railroad negligence; duty to warn; summary judgment; genuine issue of material fact. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment for the railroad, holding that under Illinois law, a jury could find the crew negligent for failing to sound a horn or whistle after observing a pedestrian near the tracks who appeared not to hear or see the approaching train, even though the crew could not have stopped in time. The court affirmed summary judgment on the failure-to-stop claim, but found that the adequacy of the warning signal (bell vs. horn) raised a triable issue of fact, particularly given the pedestrian's ear flaps and the crew's awareness that he may not have heard the train.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the claim that the crew failed to stop the train in time.
- Whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the claim that the crew failed to sound the horn or whistle to warn Wanago of the approaching train.
Holdings
- Summary judgment was proper because Puckett failed to produce evidence that Wanago was near the tracks when the train was at a sufficient distance to stop in time. The nonmoving party cannot rest on mere allegations but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.
- Summary judgment was improper because there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the crew's warning signal (bell only) was sufficient given that Gust observed Wanago wearing a cap with ear flaps and not appearing to hear the train. Illinois law requires railroad personnel to give effective warning signals when persons are seen in a place of danger, and the adequacy of the warning is a jury question.
Key quotations
“It is the general rule of law that a railroad has no duty to keep a lookout for trespassers, but when persons are seen on or near the tracks in a place of danger, there is a duty to give them a signal.”
“Irrespective of the statutory requirements, defendant had a common law duty to give timely warning of its approach... Under these circumstances, it could reasonably be urged that no effective warning signals were given by defendant's engineer, and whether such conduct constituted negligence was properly an issue for the jury to determine.”
“There is no fixed rule as to what constitutes special circumstances. Circumstances which courts have recognized as 'special' or 'extraordinary' include a blinding snowstorm... and malfunctioning warning lights... In contrast, it has been held that darkness, heavy fog and poor visibility do not constitute special circumstances.”
Factual background
On the misty night of March 12, 1986, Edward Wanago walked toward the 55th Street crossing of the Indiana Harbor Belt railroad tracks. The crossing had flashers, bells and automobile gates, but no pedestrian gates, which operated properly. Engineer Maves and brakeman Gust sat in the rear of the locomotive as the train sped north. Gust first observed Wanago when the train was 100-150 feet from the crossing, standing on the west rail of the middle set of tracks. Gust noticed Wanago wore a cap with ear flaps and never looked at the train. Within seconds, Wanago shuffled toward the tracks, and Gust yelled to engage the emergency brake, but the locomotive skidded 400-500 feet past the crossing, striking and killing Wanago.
Procedural history
The district court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on May 12, 1989, concluding that Puckett failed to produce evidence supporting her negligence claims. Puckett appealed.
Remand instructions
On remand, the district court may again exclude evidence of Wanago's careful performance of his daily activities, as such evidence would be inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 406 and state evidentiary law. The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.