Janet Greenwell v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corporation, doing business as Aztar Casino v. Matthew B. Kern and Gregory J. Loomis

Janet Greenwell v. Aztar Indiana Gaming Corp., 268 F.3d 486 (7th Cir. 2001) · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · October 4, 2001 · No. Nos. 00-3753, 00-3879

Summary

The Seventh Circuit addressed jurisdictional and procedural issues arising from an employee's claims against a riverboat casino and the casino's third-party claims against doctors who treated her. The court held that the plaintiff's malpractice-related claims were not viable under the Jones Act or maritime maintenance-and-cure doctrine, and that the Indiana medical-review statute did not govern the federal claims. The court modified the dismissal to be on the merits and affirmed as modified.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
Posner, Circuit Judge; Fairchild, Circuit Judge; Bauer, Circuit Judge
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
October 4, 2001
Docket number
Nos. 00-3753, 00-3879
Procedural posture
Aztar appealed the dismissal of its third-party claims against Kern and Loomis, and Greenwell cross-appealed the dismissal without prejudice of her malpractice-related claims against Aztar. The Seventh Circuit exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over Greenwell's interlocutory appeal and reached the merits.
Standard of review
The court reviewed appellate jurisdiction and the legal basis for dismissal de novo.
Precedential value
published precedential opinion
Parties
Aztar Indiana Gaming Corporation, doing business as Aztar Casino, Janet Greenwell v. Matthew B. Kern, Gregory J. Loomis
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

appellate jurisdictioninterlocutory appealthird party practiceadmiralty jurisdictionjones act

Practice areas

admiralty and maritime lawcivil procedureappellate jurisdictionJones Actmedical malpractice

Questions Presented

  1. Whether the district court's dismissal of Greenwell's malpractice claims was immediately appealable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) or the admiralty interlocutory-appeal statute.
  2. Whether pendent appellate jurisdiction permitted review of Greenwell's interlocutory appeal because it was closely related to Aztar's appeal from dismissal of its third-party claims.
  3. Whether Indiana's medical-malpractice precomplaint-review statute applied to Greenwell's federal Jones Act and maintenance-and-cure claims.
  4. Whether Greenwell's allegations established federal admiralty or Jones Act jurisdiction after she abandoned the allegation that her back injury occurred at work.
  5. Whether Aztar could implead Kern and Loomis under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(c) or Rule 14(a).
  6. Whether Greenwell's malpractice claims should have been dismissed on the merits and with prejudice rather than without prejudice as premature.

Holdings

  1. The district court's Rule 54(b) certification of the dismissal of Greenwell's malpractice claims was improper because the retained fraud claims overlapped too closely with the dismissed claims and did not constitute separate claims for Rule 54(b) purposes.
  2. The court may exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over an otherwise interlocutory appeal when the appeal is closely related to an appeal properly before the court and deciding both issues prevents rather than causes piecemeal appeals.
  3. Indiana's medical-malpractice precomplaint-review requirement applies to claims under Indiana law but does not apply to federal Jones Act or maintenance-and-cure claims.
  4. A maritime employment relationship alone is insufficient to establish admiralty jurisdiction over a tort claim; the alleged tort must also bear a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
  5. Greenwell's Jones Act and maintenance-and-cure claims failed on the merits because the injury did not occur in the course of her employment, the doctors were not Aztar employees or agents, and Aztar was not alleged to have negligently selected them.
  6. Because Aztar sought reimbursement from the doctors while remaining liable to Greenwell, it could proceed under ordinary Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a); Rule 14(c)'s special admiralty procedure and its Rule 9(h) designation requirement were unnecessary.

Key quotations

Pendent appellate jurisdiction is that doctrine. (¶ 7)
But now a substantial relationship between the alleged tort and some traditional maritime activity must also be shown. (¶ 9)
The district court's judgment is modified to place dismissal of the malpractice claim on the merits, and as so modified is affirmed. (¶ 17)

Factual background

Greenwell experienced back pain while working aboard a casino boat owned by Aztar on a navigable Indiana waterway. She had been seeing a chiropractor before the episode aboard the boat and later underwent back surgery by doctors Kern and Loomis, whom Aztar had referred her to. Greenwell alleged that the doctors committed malpractice and that Aztar was liable for directing or improperly inducing her to use them, but she did not allege that Aztar knew or should have known that the doctors were incompetent.

Procedural history

Greenwell sued Aztar alleging work-related injury, maintenance and cure, Jones Act liability, medical malpractice, fraud, and related tort claims. After Greenwell admitted that her back condition predated her casino-boat employment, she amended her complaint to abandon the work-injury allegation and instead challenge Aztar's referral of her to Kern and Loomis. The district court dismissed the malpractice claims without prejudice for failure to complete Indiana's medical-review procedure and dismissed Aztar's third-party claims against the doctors. It entered partial final judgments under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). The Seventh Circuit held that Aztar's appeal was properly before it, exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction over Greenwell's related appeal, modified the dismissal of the malpractice claims to be on the merits and with prejudice, and affirmed as modified.

Remand instructions

The judgment was modified so that Greenwell's malpractice claim was dismissed on the merits and with prejudice, and affirmed as modified. The district court was left to decide in the first instance whether to dismiss the remaining supplemental claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).

Court Document

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