Summary
The Seventh Circuit held that a supervised release condition prohibiting "excessive use of alcohol" is impermissibly vague unless defined, and ordered the judgment amended to define it as a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%. The court also found a travel restriction limiting movement to a "jurisdiction" impermissibly vague, requiring substitution of "judicial district" and inclusion of the district where the defendant's wife resides. The case addresses scrivener's errors in written judgments, waiver principles, and the importance of promptly reviewing judgments under Rule 35(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the condition prohibiting 'excessive use of alcohol' without a definition is impermissibly vague.
- Whether the condition restricting travel to the 'jurisdiction' where supervised is impermissibly vague and fails to include the district where Hudson's wife resides.
Holdings
- A condition of supervised release prohibiting 'excessive' alcohol use without definition is impermissibly vague, but here the omission of the definition in the written judgment is a scrivener's error; the court orders amendment to include the definition (blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%) consistent with the oral sentence.
- The term 'jurisdiction' in the travel restriction is impermissibly vague; the court orders substitution of 'judicial district' and inclusion of the district where Hudson's wife resides to reflect the oral sentence.
Key quotations
“you shall refrain from any or excessive use of alcohol (defined as having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%; or )” (2)
“you shall refrain from any or excessive use of alcohol (defined as having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08)” (2)
“you shall remain within the jurisdiction where you are being supervised, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer.” (3)
“I directed that [Hudson] will be restricted to travel in the district in which he is supervised. If he is released to the Northern District of Illinois, that would be the Northern District of Illinois.” (4)
Factual background
Darick Hudson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) recommended a condition prohibiting excessive use of alcohol defined as a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%. At sentencing, the district court reviewed that condition and Hudson's attorney confirmed no objection. The written judgment entered two days later omitted the definition. Additionally, the district court orally stated that Hudson must remain within the jurisdiction where supervised and that the condition would include the judicial district where his wife resides (Indiana), but the written judgment only stated 'you shall remain within the jurisdiction where you are being supervised, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer.'
Procedural history
Hudson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The district court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment and supervised release. The written judgment contained conditions regarding alcohol use and travel that differed from the oral pronouncement at sentencing. Hudson appealed, challenging the alcohol condition as vague and the travel restriction as vague and insufficiently including his wife's district.
Remand instructions
Remand with instructions that the written judgment be amended to include: (1) for purposes of discretionary condition number 7 of Hudson's supervised release, a definition of 'excessive use of alcohol' as having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08; and (2) for purposes of discretionary condition number 14, the language, 'you shall remain within the judicial district where you are being supervised and the judicial district in which your wife resides, unless granted permission to leave by the court or a probation officer.'