Summary
The Seventh Circuit reversed a district court ruling that terms in Indiana's fetal tissue statute (prohibiting acquiring, receiving, selling, or transferring tissue from an aborted fetus) were unconstitutionally vague. The court held that the statute's words have a core of understandable meaning and that any peripheral uncertainties can be resolved through state declaratory judgment actions, rejecting the vagueness challenge. The court also upheld the statute against First Amendment (conduct not speech), Equal Protection (rational basis for ethical distinction), and dormant Commerce Clause (nondiscriminatory ban) challenges, and dismissed the Takings Clause claim because Indiana University, as part of the state, cannot sue its own state. The decision emphasizes that federal courts should not invalidate a state criminal statute on vagueness grounds before state courts have had an opportunity to interpret it.
Holdings
- The statute is not unconstitutionally vague because the challenged terms ('acquires,' 'receives,' 'transfers,' 'any other part') have a substantial core of ascertainable meaning, and the state judiciary can resolve any ambiguities through declaratory judgments and interpretive processes.
- The statute does not violate equal protection because it survives rational-basis review. The distinction between fetal tissue from abortions and miscarriages is supported by ethical considerations.
- The statute regulates conduct, not speech, and does not violate the First Amendment.
- The statute does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause because it does not discriminate against interstate commerce and does not impose a disproportionate burden on it.
- The takings claim fails because Indiana University, as part of the State of Indiana, cannot sue its own state, and the state legislature is free to decide what use to make of state property.
Questions Presented
- Whether Ind. Code § 35-46-5-1.5 is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause.
- Whether the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause by distinguishing between fetal tissue from abortions and miscarriages.
- Whether the statute violates the First Amendment by interfering with medical research.
- Whether the statute violates the Commerce Clause by regulating interstate fetal tissue.
- Whether the statute effects an unconstitutional taking of Indiana University's property.
Disposition
reversed_and_remanded
Cases Cited (30)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015)(cited)
- United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87 (1975)(cited)
- Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1913)(cited)
- Thomas v. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. 316 (2002)(cited)
- Bauer v. Shepard, 620 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2010)(cited)
- Civil Service Commission v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973)(cited)
- Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)(cited)
- Rose v. Locke, 423 U.S. 48 (1975)(cited)
- Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983)(overruled in part)
- Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)(overruled)
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