Marcos Santiago v. J.C. Streeval

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · June 2, 2022 · No. No. 20-2665

Summary

The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of a § 2241 habeas petition, holding that the petitioner could not invoke the § 2255(e) saving clause to challenge his felon-in-possession convictions under *Rehaif v. United States*. To use the saving clause, a prisoner must show actual innocence under the demanding "no reasonable juror" standard, and the petitioner failed to prove that no reasonable juror would find he knew he was a felon when he possessed the firearm. The court also denied an evidentiary hearing, finding the petitioner's uncorroborated denial of knowledge insufficient to warrant one. The dissent argued that the petitioner's minimal prior sentence and minor predicate offenses raised sufficient doubt to merit a hearing and questioned whether the "no reasonable juror" standard should apply to legal-innocence claims under the saving clause.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
Hamilton; Kanne; Wood
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decision date
June 2, 2022
Docket number
No. 20-2665
Procedural posture
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Western Division, denial of petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
Standard of review
We review de novo a district court's denial of a § 2241 petition.
Precedential value
Published
Parties
Marcos F. Santiago v. J.C. Streeval
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

habeas corpuscriminal proceduresentencingstatutory interpretationburden of proof

Practice areas

Criminal LawHabeas CorpusPost-Conviction Relief

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Santiago can invoke the § 2255(e) saving clause to pursue a § 2241 petition based on Rehaif v. United States.
  2. Whether Santiago has shown actual innocence of the felon-in-possession charges under the Rehaif standard.
  3. Whether the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing.

Holdings

  1. Santiago cannot satisfy the saving clause because he has not shown actual innocence under the 'no reasonable juror' standard.
  2. An evidentiary hearing is not warranted because Santiago's allegations are vague and conclusory, and he has not shown that any additional evidence could meet the actual innocence standard.

Key quotations

Section 2255 may be deemed inadequate or ineffective if it did not give the petitioner 'a reasonable opportunity to obtain a reliable judicial determination of the fundamental legality of his conviction and sentence.' (at 6)
to prove actual innocence, the petitioner must show 'that more likely than not … no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' (at 9)
a person who is a felon 'ordinarily knows he is a felon,' and 'That simple truth is not lost upon juries.' (at 14)

Factual background

Over three weeks in 2002, Santiago participated in a string of armed robberies at hotels in Pennsylvania. He was arrested holding the firearm used in the robberies. A jury convicted him of three Hobbs Act counts, two counts of possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and two counts of possessing a firearm as a felon. The felon-in-possession counts were based on his prior state felony convictions for criminal trespass and retail theft. He was sentenced to 33.5 years in prison. His direct appeal was affirmed. He later sought post-conviction relief under § 2241 based on Rehaif, arguing the government did not prove he knew he was a felon.

Procedural history

Santiago was convicted in 2005 in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for Hobbs Act robbery, § 924(c), and § 922(g)(1). Direct appeal affirmed. He filed a § 2255 motion in 2007, denied. He later sought relief under § 2241 in the Northern District of Illinois based on Rehaif v. United States. The district court denied relief, concluding he could not show actual innocence to invoke the saving clause of § 2255(e).

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…