Summary
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Deputy Stefanie Pedersen in a § 1983 civil rights action brought by Mark Petersen. The court held that Deputy Pedersen had probable cause to arrest Petersen for operating while intoxicated based on circumstantial evidence and his visible signs of intoxication, and that the subsequent nonconsensual blood draw was supported by a valid search warrant. Consequently, the deputy was entitled to qualified immunity on both claims.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether Deputy Pedersen had probable cause to arrest Petersen for operating while intoxicated when no one personally observed him driving.
- Whether the district court properly granted qualified immunity on the false-arrest claim.
- Whether the blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment because the warrant was allegedly based on false statements concerning whether Petersen had been seen driving.
- Whether the state court's probable-cause ruling had preclusive effect in the § 1983 action.
Holdings
- Probable cause supported Petersen's arrest for operating while intoxicated even though no witness personally observed him driving, because the totality of the circumstances established a sufficient probability that he had driven the vehicle while intoxicated.
- Deputy Pedersen was entitled to qualified immunity because she had actual probable cause and therefore, at minimum, arguable probable cause to arrest Petersen.
- The blood draw was lawful because it was conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, and Petersen produced no evidence that Deputy Pedersen knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly made false statements necessary to the warrant's probable-cause determination.
- Petersen forfeited his collateral-estoppel argument by failing to raise it in the district court, and the argument would not alter the result because Deputy Pedersen was independently protected by qualified immunity.
Key quotations
“The relevant question is not whether Deputy Pedersen was certain that Mr. Petersen was driving while intoxicated. Rather, it is whether, under a totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for Deputy Pedersen to arrest because there was a “sufficient probability, not certainty” that Mr. Petersen violated the OWI statute.” (8)
“Given the erratic tire tracks, the state of the scene, and Mr. Petersen’s inebriation, the common-sense conclusion was that he had been driving the car in the crash Deputy Pedersen was dispatched to investigate.” (9)
“The transcript is clear. Mr. Petersen’s accusation that Deputy Pedersen misled Judge Seifert is wrong.” (13)
Factual background
Deputy Pedersen responded about fifteen minutes after a reported crash and found tire tracks through a yard, broken branches, a disabled vehicle, and Petersen attempting to change its tire. Petersen was unsteady, smelled of intoxicants, had bloodshot eyes and slurred speech, attempted to flee, and was identified by bystanders as the only person near the vehicle. Pedersen arrested him for operating while intoxicated and later obtained an oral search warrant for a blood draw, which revealed a blood alcohol concentration of 0.213 g/100 mL.
Procedural history
Petersen was charged in Wisconsin state court with fourth-offense operating while intoxicated. The state trial court suppressed the blood-test evidence for lack of probable cause, after which the State voluntarily dismissed the criminal case. Petersen then brought this § 1983 action; after the district court narrowed the case to false-arrest and blood-draw claims against Deputy Pedersen, it granted her summary judgment and qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.