Padma Rao v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · September 30, 2025 · No. 24-1347

Summary

This Seventh Circuit order denies a petition for rehearing en banc filed by Defendant-Appellee J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. The court also issues a technical amendment to its August 27, 2025 opinion concerning the innocent construction rule and qualified privilege in a defamation dispute. The revised language clarifies that factual disputes regarding whether the statements were understood as defamatory must be resolved by a jury.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN; CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI; JOSHUA P. KOLAR
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decision date
September 30, 2025
Docket number
24-1347
Procedural posture
Petition for rehearing en banc denied; opinion amended to clarify that Chase cannot prevail under the innocent construction rule and that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding qualified privilege.
Precedential value
published
Parties
Padma Rao v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., KIEFER KRAUSE, Mary M. Rowland
Disposition
other

Topics

defamationappellate jurisdictionstandard of review

Practice areas

torts

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Chase can prevail as a matter of law under the innocent construction rule.
  2. Whether genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Krause's alleged abuse of qualified privilege.

Holdings

  1. Chase cannot prevail as a matter of law under the innocent construction rule because it does not offer an alternative reasonable interpretation of Krause’s statements.
  2. There are genuine issues of material fact about whether Krause abused his qualified privilege, so a jury must determine whether the statement was defamatory or referred to the plaintiff.

Key quotations

Because Chase does not offer an alternative reasonable interpretation of Krause’s statements, it cannot prevail as a matter of law under the innocent construction rule. (2)
Because we conclude that Chase cannot prevail under the innocent construction rule as a matter of law, and that there are genuine issues of material fact about whether Krause abused his qualified privilege, a jury must determine “whether the statement was in fact understood to be defamatory or to refer to the plaintiff.” (2)

Factual background

The plaintiff alleged that statements made by Krause were defamatory. The defendant argued that the statements were protected by the innocent construction rule and qualified privilege. The court examined whether an alternative reasonable interpretation of the statements existed and whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the abuse of qualified privilege.

Procedural history

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division (case No. 1:21-cv-01361). The Seventh Circuit issued an opinion on August 27, 2025, which was later amended after a petition for rehearing en banc was denied on September 10, 2025.

Court Document

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