Summary
The Seventh Circuit vacated a district court’s preliminary injunction regulating federal immigration-enforcement activities and dismissed the government’s appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2). The court concluded that vacatur was appropriate because the case appeared moot and because the injunction could produce adverse legal consequences, including preclusive effects and reliance in future litigation. Judge Easterbrook dissented, arguing that the court should have dismissed the appeal without vacating the district court’s order because all parties had abandoned the litigation.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the Seventh Circuit should grant an unopposed motion under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2) to dismiss the appeal.
- Whether the court should vacate the district court's preliminary injunction under the Munsingwear doctrine after the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the underlying action and the controversy appeared moot.
- Whether extraordinary equitable circumstances independently justified vacatur to prevent the unreviewed preliminary injunction from producing legal consequences.
- Whether the district court's sua sponte decertification of the class and dismissal without prejudice affected the equities supporting vacatur.
Holdings
- Dismissal under Rule 42(b)(2) is discretionary rather than automatic, and the court may review the case before dismissing the appeal.
- Vacatur of the preliminary injunction was appropriate because the plaintiffs sought only forward-looking injunctive relief, the enforcement operation had ended or substantially diminished, and no live controversy appeared to remain.
- Even if mootness were uncertain, extraordinary circumstances independently justified vacating the preliminary injunction.
- After vacating the district court's preliminary-injunction order, the court dismissed the appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2).
Key quotations
“Vacatur is therefore appropriate for two independent reasons. This case appears to be moot, and the district court’s order risks spawning serious legal consequences if it is not vacated.” (8)
“All told, vacatur is the right remedy for this extraordinary case.” (15)
“We VACATE the district court’s order granting the preliminary injunction. And we DISMISS this appeal under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b)(2).” (15)
Factual background
During Operation Midway Blitz, federal immigration authorities conducted intensified enforcement activities in the Chicago area. Protesters and journalists alleged that federal agents used tear gas, pepper balls, and other force against demonstrations, particularly outside the Broadview, Illinois, detention facility. The district court entered a broad classwide preliminary injunction covering federal law-enforcement activity throughout Chicago, but the operation later ended or substantially diminished, and the plaintiffs reported no recent unconstitutional conduct.
Procedural history
Plaintiffs sued federal immigration authorities for alleged First and Fourth Amendment violations arising from the use of tear gas and other crowd-control measures at demonstrations. The district court certified a class and entered a sweeping preliminary injunction. The Seventh Circuit stayed the injunction, and the plaintiffs later moved to dismiss the case after the enforcement operation substantially ceased. The district court dismissed without prejudice and sua sponte decertified the class, after which the government sought dismissal of the appeal and vacatur of the injunction.