Summary
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Nikko D’Ambrosio’s Illinois statutory and common-law claims arising from social media posts about his dating conduct. The court held that the allegations did not establish a commercial purpose under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act or satisfy the intent, knowledge, and harm requirements of Illinois’s Civil Liability for Doxing Act. The court also ordered D’Ambrosio and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for a frivolous appeal and inaccurate quotations and citations in the opening brief.
Topics
Practice areas
Questions Presented
- Whether the complaint plausibly alleged that defendants used D’Ambrosio’s identity for a commercial purpose under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act.
- Whether the complaint plausibly alleged the intent, knowledge or reckless disregard, identification, and resulting-harm elements of an Illinois Civil Liability for Doxing Act claim.
- Whether the alleged link to an article about Anthony LaMonica was reasonably capable of an innocent construction and therefore could support defamation per se.
- Whether D’Ambrosio adequately pleaded special damages and concrete pecuniary loss for defamation per quod.
- Whether the false-light claim failed under Illinois’s innocent-construction rule and whether the civil-conspiracy claim failed because it rested on no viable independent tort.
- Whether the negligence, negligent-entrustment, and strict-products-liability claims were waived on appeal because D’Ambrosio did not challenge the district court’s waiver ruling.
- Whether the appeal as to the Rajalas was frivolous and whether sanctions and attorney discipline should be considered.
Holdings
- A plaintiff does not plausibly allege an IRPA commercial purpose merely by alleging that a platform displayed unrelated advertisements next to posts containing the plaintiff’s likeness. The identity must help sell or promote a product, service, or fundraising effort, and a free-floating profit motive is insufficient.
- A Doxing Act claim requires six elements: intentional publication of personally identifiable information; identification of the person without reliance on extrinsic sources; lack of consent; intent to harm or harass; knowledge or reckless disregard of a reasonable likelihood of death, bodily injury, or stalking; and one or more statutorily specified resulting harms.
- The alleged comment linking to an article about Anthony LaMonica was reasonably capable of an innocent construction and therefore did not support a defamation-per-se claim against the defendants.
- A defamation-per-quod claim requires specifically pleaded special damages in federal court, and generalized allegations of emotional distress, reputational harm, or lost opportunities are insufficient without an identified concrete pecuniary loss.
- The false-light claim failed because the alleged statement was subject to an innocent construction, and the civil-conspiracy claim failed because Illinois treats civil conspiracy as derivative of an underlying independent tort that was not adequately pleaded.
- The court affirmed dismissal of the negligence, negligent-entrustment, and strict-products-liability claims because D’Ambrosio did not challenge on appeal the district court’s alternative ruling that he waived those claims below.
- The appeal was entirely frivolous as to the Rajalas because D’Ambrosio and his attorneys failed to advance any conceivable reason to reverse dismissal of the claims against them. The court ordered D’Ambrosio and attorneys Walner and Trent to show cause regarding attorney fees, costs, and attorney-specific sanctions, and referred the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.
Key quotations
“A free-floating profit motive is not enough.” (10)
“We read a Doxing Act claim to have six elements: (1) intentional publication of personally identifiable information; (2) the published information identifies a person without reliance on extrinsic sources; (3) lack of consent to the publication; (4) intent to harm or harass; (5) knowledge or reckless disregard of a reasonable likelihood of death, bodily injury, or stalking to the person whose information is published; and (6) one or more of the listed harms results.” (12-13)
“Submitting fictitious quotations to a court, regardless of how they are generated, is obviously inconsistent with the standards of conduct this court expects from attorneys practicing in this court and the standards of appellate briefing imposed by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28.” (21)
“Briefs and other court submissions that include fictitious quotations—inaccuracies discoverable with elementary professional care—are unacceptable and unbecoming members of our bar.” (32)
Factual background
D’Ambrosio alleged that Abbigail Rajala, whom he briefly dated, and other users posted photographs and statements about him in a large Facebook group concerning dating experiences. Rajala posted descriptions of her experience dating D’Ambrosio and a screenshot of an offensive text message he allegedly sent her; another user posted a link to an article about a sexual-assault defendant named Anthony LaMonica whose photograph did not resemble D’Ambrosio. D’Ambrosio alleged that the Rajalas, the group administrators and their corporation, and Meta were liable for statutory and common-law claims based on publication, amplification, fundraising, or facilitation of the posts. He did not allege that he was actually stalked or physically harmed, identify a call to action, or plead concrete financial losses from the alleged defamation.
Procedural history
D’Ambrosio sued under Illinois statutory and common law based on social-media posts concerning his dating conduct. The Northern District of Illinois granted separate Rule 12(b)(6) motions filed by Rajala, her parents, the Spill the Tea defendants, and Meta, held that further amendment would be futile, and dismissed the case with prejudice. On appeal, D’Ambrosio dismissed the appeal as to twenty-six Jane Doe defendants to eliminate a potential complete-diversity problem. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and ordered D’Ambrosio and his attorneys to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for frivolously appealing the claims against the Rajalas and for briefing misconduct.
Remand instructions
No merits remand. D’Ambrosio and attorneys Walner and Trent must show cause by June 16, 2026, regarding proposed sanctions; the Rajalas may submit fees and costs by June 1, 2026, and may reply thereafter. The clerk must forward the opinion to the Illinois Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission. Single costs are awarded to Meta and the STT defendants; costs as to the Rajalas are reserved for a later order.