Tire Town Auto LLC v. Wood County

Tire Town Auto · United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit · May 12, 2026 · No. 25-1883

Summary

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Tire Town Auto LLC’s procedural due process claim against Wood County. The court held that Tire Town did not plausibly allege a constitutionally protected property interest in remaining on the county’s towing rotation list because no statute, regulation, contract, or mutually explicit understanding limited the county’s discretion to remove businesses. The court concluded that the county’s Minimum Standards policy, which disclaimed contractual status and permitted removal for any appropriate reason, did not create such an entitlement.

Court
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Writing for the Court
Hamilton; St. Eve; Pryor
Jurisdiction
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
Decision date
May 12, 2026
Docket number
25-1883
Procedural posture
Appeal from dismissal of an amended complaint for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Standard of review
De novo review of a district court's decision to dismiss on the pleadings; factual allegations are accepted as true and reasonable inferences are drawn in the plaintiff's favor, but legal conclusions need not be accepted.
Precedential value
Published precedential opinion
Parties
Tire Town Auto LLC v. Wood County
Disposition
affirmed

Topics

procedural due processsection 1983fourteenth amendmentmotions to dismissappellate procedure

Practice areas

constitutional lawcivil rightsmunicipal lawcivil procedure

Questions Presented

  1. Whether Tire Town plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected property interest in continued participation on Wood County's towing rotation list sufficient to support a procedural due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Holdings

  1. Tire Town did not plausibly allege a protected property interest because it identified no statute, regulation, ordinance, contract, mutually explicit understanding, or other independent source that gave it a legitimate claim of entitlement to remain on the towing rotation list. The county's policy expressly disclaimed contractual status and reserved broad discretion to remove businesses at any time for any appropriate reason.

Key quotations

To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it. (4)
When “government officials may grant or deny [a benefit] in their discretion,” as the county may here, the benefit simply “is not a protected entitlement.” (6)
A property interest of constitutional magnitude exists only when the state’s discretion is ‘clearly limited’ such that the plaintiff cannot be denied the interest ‘unless specific conditions are met.’ (7)
For a plaintiff to invoke a property interest based on a “mutually explicit understanding,” the understanding must indeed be mutual. (7)

Factual background

Tire Town operated a towing business in Wood County, Wisconsin, and for several years appeared on the county's towing rotation list for disabled vehicles. The county's Minimum Standards policy required participating businesses to satisfy requirements such as 24-hour availability and specified liability insurance, but expressly stated that it was not a contract and allowed the county to withdraw an offer to any participant at any time for any appropriate reason. After complaints that Tire Town employees failed to wear reflective vests and that Tire Town twice overcharged vehicle owners, the county removed Tire Town from the list.

Procedural history

Tire Town sued Wood County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the county violated its Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process rights by removing it from the county's towing rotation list. The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin dismissed the amended complaint because Tire Town had not plausibly alleged a constitutionally protected property interest. The Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo and affirmed.

Court Document

Open PDF
Loading document…